

FORMOSA—THE TEST 20

THE DEFENSE OF OUR CITIES

# The Reporter

September 12, 1950 25c

PEACE IN THE PENTAGON



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## REPORTER'S NOTES

### On Curbing Communism

There have been various proposals lately for outlawing the Communist Party or, at least, restricting its activities. Before adjourning, Congress will most probably pass a bill of this kind, for it is generally felt that Communism is an exceptional trouble that has to be dealt with by exceptional measures.

In point of fact, everybody knows that Communism hasn't much of a chance of overthrowing our constitutional form of government. If somewhere there is a man who fancies himself the future Premier of the People's Republic of the United States, he belongs in a padded, rather than in a prison, cell. Nevertheless Communism is a pernicious nuisance because of what it does or tries to do and even more because of what it begets. It is an organized center of disloyalty; it arouses such strong emotions that a new profession has come into existence—the anti-Communists vigilante; finally, it keeps even the most level-headed people on edge, for the gnat of today—the party member—may at any moment turn into that wasp—the professional ex-Communist.

All this makes the prospect of anti-Communist legislation irresistibly appealing. If only we could bequeath to our children a genteel America with no Communist or anti-Communist crusaders to worry about. If only we could, for some years, concentrate on the former Communists we have got, do our best to rehabilitate them, and then have no more. If only we could with one well-drafted, well-enforced statute, get rid of party members, fellow travel-

ers, anti-Communist vigilantes, and former Communists. What a haul!

One trouble with anti-Communist legislation is that while other countries of the western alliance may be tempted to follow our precedent, they have a far more formidable Communist threat to cope with. Yet if the world is to have anything resembling peace, and if the withering away of Soviet Russia takes too long, some day a form of international control of this international menace will have to be found.

A logical solution would be a sort of international U. N. concordat: The Russian government would pledge itself to provide the necessary funds for rehabilitating the disgruntled veterans of Communist subversion and for old-age pensions to faithful party members. The other high contracting parties, the non-Communist nations, would allow those of their citizens who follow the calling of Communism to live in communities of their own, talk their verbiage to each other, and concoct figures proving the imminent collapse of the capitalist economy.

### Dateline: New York

To the naive or frightened people of foreign countries, Malik's tirades at the Security Council may have rung almost credible because they were pronounced in New York. The New York dateline under which Malik's speeches were reported must have given them a sort of authenticity they would not have had coming straight from Moscow.

Our delegates to the incoming session of the General Assembly should remember this. The responsibility falling on them from the fact that New York is host to the United Nations can be met only if they provide constant leadership to the free world.

Moreover, in a few weeks that unreal suburban dateline of the U. N.—

Lake Success—will disappear, for the headquarters of the U. N. will be Forty-second Street, New York City.

### Total Politics

Most of our Congressmen seem to have got into a psychopathic frenzy since the Korean War, a sort of all-or-nothing frame of mind. Rather than have controls on some things, let's control everything, some say; rather than a limited war against the North Koreans, let's have a total war against the whole of Red Asia. They answer the demands of limited war with a feverish attack of total politics.

Of course, these distraught legislators might have kept their heads better if the Communists had attacked on June 25, 1949, rather than 1950. But those of our Congressmen who seem to be in a daze about how to please the voters are perhaps far less wise than they think. Whether or not we get those all-out controls that some of them would like to impose on us, there may be an all-out mobilization of wide-awake men and women in every single constituency.

The American people, thank God, are free and among the many weapons to save the country they have at their disposal there is still the ballot.

### Amerasia

We must confess that we felt quite impressed and more than a bit guilty looking at a recent issue of *Time* magazine. On the masthead the names of all the staff members familiar with the Far East, and mostly, of course, China, were checked in red. This gave us a clearer idea of that publication which we have perhaps been criticizing too harshly. We understand it better now. It's a publication marked by a hyphenated Asian-American or American-Asian outlook and policy.

Somehow another Chinese-American concoction comes to mind: chop suey—a dish which nobody knows in China and which certainly does not represent the Chinese taste; but in America it is cheap and goes over in a big way. The only trouble with chop suey is that it gives you a bellyful but it leaves you with a peculiar taste in the mouth, and the feeling that nothing you have eaten has stuck to your ribs.



# Correspondence

## 'Hollow Mockery'

To the Editor: Your editorial of August 1, "The Propaganda Front," is the most astute and penetrating analysis of this problem I have read anywhere.

Freedom, as you say, must have definite, tangible aims to rally the masses to our side. It is a hollow mockery to tell wretched people anywhere that they are "free" merely because they are not yet under Moscow's domination.

I hope your magazine will quickly gain the immense circulation it merits.

GERALD HOLLIHAN  
New York City

## Andalusian Tragedy

To the Editor: Mr. Wertenbaker, in his "Feria in Seville," has given an interesting and colorful picture of life in Andalusia that has not changed since the days of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship.

However, it is questionable whether the changeless Andalusian tragedy is typical of the rest of Spain. Appalling as are Spanish social problems everywhere, they differ enormously in each province. Andalusia is a world of its own, and there is a growing social conscience in Catalonia, Castile, and particularly the Basque provinces, of which there is little or no trace in Andalusia.

Moreover, Mr. Wertenbaker has his facts wrong in his attack on Cardinal Segura. Cardinal Segura was Archbishop of Toledo at the time of the abolition of monarchy and was shortly afterwards exiled by the Republican government. He remained in exile until he was appointed Archbishop of Seville some time after Queipo de Llano's successful Seville uprising against the Republic. Clearly, therefore, he cannot have supported or opposed the Republic's social reforms in Seville, as he was never in Seville during the Republican era, and indeed spent only an infinitesimal part of that period in Spain at all.

ANTHONY MOORE  
New York City

## American Values

To the Editor: For several years now I have been struggling with problems faced by every American in trying to figure out where America is going as far as its domestic and foreign affairs are concerned.

I believe that little by little Americans have to relinquish their individual values and become accustomed to thinking in terms of group values. We have to face the limitations of our economy in terms of individualistic self-expression. We have to learn to become comfortable with the fact that the American dream of equality for everyone is a fantasy. We need to concentrate on institutions which insure a decent basic standard for all the

people, since there is no doubt but what the country can afford it. We need to focus on social and political forces which operate to deprive certain groups severely and seek means of correcting them. We have to give up a vocabulary of idealistic nonsense and attempt to define and describe what really exists. I subscribed to your magazine because I felt that was your purpose.

As a people, we have not faced too many traumatic experiences. Even our depression was not a famine. We have lived with technical devices that relieve us of many of the threatening, primitive problems faced by other peoples. Perhaps we seem callous and shallow to peoples who have suffered from hunger, pain, and lack of respect for themselves as human beings. We have our problems too—not those of physical survival, but those of emotional survival. Americans should stop seeking for more of what they already possess and should begin considering what they are doing with what they have. We have reached the point of diminishing returns as far as what our wealth, individually and collectively, can bring us. How comfortable can you get? Are we just going to grow fatter, or are we going to grow in our social, political, and aesthetic thinking and feeling?

The problem of the strong and well-fed is to help the weak find food and grow strong. Being like us is no guarantee of real growth, it is only imitation. Why should others imitate us when they can be themselves? I am confident that the American people are ma-

turing; I am also confident that other peoples have resources to solve their own problems if they are given both material help to meet their need and a vote of confidence in their capacity to handle their problems in their own way. As a matter of fact, as Americans, we do not have the know-how to give other people advice; the solutions we would impose would probably fail. I speak from the experience of a social case worker who has attempted to rehabilitate defeated individuals; I can take over the situation like a good mother and solve the problem, but the child has not been allowed to grow up.

PATRICIA HOWELL  
Seattle, Washington

## 'Start Now' in Asia

To the Editor: I think that Mr. Flamand has made an excellent analysis of the problems which confront us in Asia. I have read many splendid articles in *The Reporter*, but I believe that "Making our Asian Policy Work" is one of the most weighty, the most well-prepared, and the most thoroughly thought-out article that has appeared in your very informative publication. If we are to save Asia, we will do well to start now. I think that Mr. Flamand has done very well in making at least a tentative plan for the acquisition of Asia's friendship.

RICHARD H. JONES  
New York City

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## The Editors



# The Reporter

A FORTNIGHTLY OF FACTS AND IDEAS

September 12, 1950

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## Mobilization for What?

Page

The Gun Gap—an Editorial	Max Ascoli	4
Formosa—the Test	Albert Ravenholt	6
Mobilization: Truman's Ideas	Douglass Cater	9
Aggression Arouses the West	Harold N. Graves, Jr.	13
Peace Breaks Out in the Pentagon	Vance Johnson	14
How Effective Is Our Intelligence?	Sherman Kent	17

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## At Home & Abroad

The Puerto Ricans: Slum to Slum	M. R. Werner	20
Hardships in New York vs. poverty in the Caribbean		
Australia's Menzies—Friend in Need	C. Hartley Grattan	23
The man whose country is one of our Pacific military anchors		
The Defense of Our Cities	R E Lapp	26
What the atomic bomb can do and what we can do about it		
Matrons with a Mission	Sylvia Wright	30
How things look to the General Federation of Women's Clubs		

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## Views & Reviews

Stalin Talks at Last	Isaac Deutscher	33
The postwar pronouncement that has Moscow buzzing		
The Milwaukee Journal	Llewellyn White	36
The second of two articles on an exemplary paper		
To Man's Measure . . .	Gouverneur Paulding	40
Soldier off to war		

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# The Gun Gap

It has become a standard refrain in the sermons of our Jeremiahs: We have twelve divisions against the Russians' 175, a few thousand tanks against more than forty thousand, a few thousand modern planes against nineteen thousand. These figures have become particularly nightmarish since they were proclaimed in Parliament by that Jeremiah-in-Chief Winston Churchill.

Only a few months ago—just last spring in fact—one of the main worries of our policymakers was the "dollar gap." Our national economy was growing too fast for its own good and for the good of the rest of the world. As a result foreign nations had great difficulty selling us anything or buying anything from us. The Korean aggression has dramatized another case of overproduction. Soviet Russia has—so it seems—produced so many guns and tanks and planes and snorkel submarines that only with a gigantic effort of total mobilization, lasting several years, can the countries of the western alliance hope substantially to narrow—or close—the "gun gap."

Unquestionably, the Jeremiahs have a formidable case. The picture they paint is gloomy enough, yet an even gloomier and more realistic one can be painted, for we should all know by now that Soviet Russia is using several powerful nonmilitary weapons in its systematic campaign for the conquest of the world. In fact, it is rather naive to think that the only form of Russian aggression is to set Red satellite divisions marching, North Korea style, against some weak nation on the perimeter of the Russian empire.

At present the Communist nonmilitary offensive is aimed at the individual—every man and woman who cannot accept the idea of a new war and who is looking for some form of personal exemption. With their drive for new members or with their so-called Peace Petition, the Communists corner the frightened and bewildered, extract their signatures, and promise in exchange if not peace in the world at least a measure of personal peace the day Communism takes over.

The Jeremiahs who bewail our lack of arms sometimes forget that the Communists have become extraordinarily cunning at the art of unnerving, man by man, the people who are supposed to bear arms. They have been particularly skillful in western

Europe, where people have gone through too much. The result is called neutralism. Actually, European neutralism is a naive, pathetic expression of the anguish of European individuals who see the next test coming and beg to be left out. More than a policy it is an individual state of mind. And more than a state of mind it is a reaction of the flesh.

## *Where Our Government Was Right*

Our government might have miscalculated the Communists' readiness to fight; it might have misjudged the amount and the quality of their arms. But certainly it did not need the Stockholm Petition to realize that despair is the best ally of Communism. Since the end of the war, the United States has done something more than feed hungry foreign people. It has learned, through the ECA, the first rudimentary notions of how to work on the economy of other countries, speed the machinery of production, reduce unemployment, stabilize the rates of exchange, increase exports. ECA missions have done all this—not as colonial masters, but in the closest possible co-operation with local national, business, and trade-union leaders. Of course, quite a number of ECA representatives have been gullible and indiscriminate in their associations and friendships; yet the job that ECA has done in a little over two years has been so striking that the Russians have launched all their offensives, political and military, against what they call the "Marshallized" countries.

After Secretary Marshall's Harvard speech, the main aim of our government's foreign policy was to reduce and finally to close the dollar gap. We were not happy to be forever outproducing other countries and wanted the friendly nations to catch up with us and sell us the products they were the most fit to produce. This was our policy—what the Communists called the warmongering policy of American imperialism.

Then on June 25 another nation, Soviet Russia, which had been outproducing the rest of the world in its kind of products—weapons—launched its export drive of blazing guns and robotized men.

That rude jolt taught us and our allies quite a

few lessons. We suddenly realized that our military weakness had been too tempting to the Communists and that they were aiming not only to conquer South Korea but to unleash a shattering wave of fear in the world that would pave the way for other conquests. It became clear that we as well as our allies had to produce far more weapons and train a very large number of men to handle these weapons. Some people, particularly in Congress, have gone so far that they now consider that all other expenses for foreign rehabilitation and assistance are sheer waste, and that the only thing to do is to produce tanks and guns and planes, prayerfully hoping that Joseph Stalin will kindly wait a few years and let us close the gun gap.

### *Our Weapons and Russia's*

If we follow this policy, we shall be entering the kind of competition with Russia that would multiply rather than solve our difficulties. For we need allies in our struggle with international Communism: we need men all over the non-Communist world who not only can manufacture weapons but, if need be, use them with steady hearts, with the firm knowledge that the defense of their countries is the only way of defending their personal lot—without any yearning for indulgence or escape. We cannot expect any real help from mercenaries or from captive armies brought to our side by anti-Stalinist chieftains. We need, in our country and in the countries that are with us, well-trained armies of citizen-soldiers ready to fight for the defense of their citizenship.

If we are to win this struggle, the work to improve the economic and political conditions of the people on our side must become immensely more effective and articulate. Now, in western Europe there is no longer any talk of a dollar gap, and war matériel is once more to be produced in ever-increasing quantity. This gives the old predatory interests all over the continent a golden opportunity to extract fat contracts from their governments, ultimately to be paid for by the American taxpayer. They are the same interests who have for decades sedulously prevented the large-scale production of consumer goods so as to enjoy the advantages of huge profits and of cheap labor. This is exactly the time when ECA missions are most needed in Europe to see that American money is not wasted or siphoned into the pockets of the most selfish business leaders. Too much of it has disappeared that way already. The ECA representatives must see to it that war contracts go to healthy industries, that war production in the various countries intensifies the process of European economic integration, and that the people's standard of living is raised. In narrowing the gun gap we

must attack the causes that have created the dollar gap. Weapons manufactured by workers who do not enjoy a decent living, who have no real bargaining power, and who are too harassed or ignorant to care about their rights of citizenship ultimately turn out to be of very limited use.

Since the end of hostilities, we have been living in a strange twilight between war and peace, war economy and peace economy, conversion and reconversion. At home, so far we have managed well. In spite of all the prophets of impending bust we are steering a middle course between boom and crash—for the New Deal taught us to ballast the booms and cushion the crashes. This democratic capitalism of ours has proved to have more resilience than our wise economists could ever have foreseen. Yet, powerful as it is, it cannot buy us out of the Communist menace. It must become closely interlocked with healthy economic systems in the nations on our side. Now our missions abroad must see to it that during the conversion to war production the level of civilian welfare is raised at the same rate as the production of military weapons is increased.

Otherwise we lose, for without allies we cannot stand. The weapons manufactured in Europe with our money will eventually fall into the hands of the Communists, if the large majority of European workers and soldiers do not regain the sense of the stake they have in their countries' freedom. Indeed, it is not the number of Russian tanks that is so frightening, but the prospect of how lonely and friendless we should be if we entrusted our safety only to the guns we can make and the divisions we can raise.

We must be prepared to tighten our belts more than we did during the last war: We have many fronts to defend—military, political, and economic—and they all demand sacrifices. Unlike the enemy, we do not use slave labor. We can never neglect the basic needs of man—man as producer, consumer, citizen, soldier. The unit of what makes our strength is man, and the kind of man on whom we can count is as good as his sense of freedom—his capacity to work and fight for it. Given our late start, we cannot easily compete with the Russian empire in the sheer production of weapons. We must acquire enough arms to discourage political and military aggression while we start releasing among our own and the allied people that kind of unbreakable strength which the enemy will never match.

In their brutish conception of force, the Communists cannot think of anything better than production of guns and dissemination of fear. Some day the unfortunate people on the other side will realize that they are the main victims of the weapons they overproduce, and that they cannot eat guns.

—MAX ASCOLI



# Formosa— The Test

The struggle in Korea has distracted American attention from the alarming possibility that our actions on Formosa may involve the United States in a general Asian war. It has also encouraged us to ignore the possibility that the American Navy and Air Force may not be able to frighten off or halt a Chinese Communist attack on that island. If the Chinese Red forces should capture Formosa *despite* United States opposition, it would be a major disaster, even if the fighting did not precipitate a world conflict. And yet these are the prospects, unless the United States acts with great speed and realism.

Earlier hopes that the leaders of the Central People's Government in Peking would call off the invasion of Formosa simply because an American fleet had moved in have now been exploded by recent reports from the mainland. All along the China coast the Communists are continuing their preparations. Some reports suggest they are making special arrangements to deal with the U.S. Navy. Meanwhile, the People's Liberation Armies in Manchuria are being reinforced with almost a quarter of a million veteran Communist troops from west and south China. These forces could go into action in the Manchuria-Korea area at about the same time as the Formosa invasion.

Chinese Communist forces that are available for the attack on Formosa include units of about eighteen armies numbering roughly five hundred thousand men. Most of these troops are concentrated around Shanghai and Hangchow Bay, and in Chekiang and Fukien Provinces. It is believed that seven armies are slated for the initial assault. The remaining armies, together with special troops, supposedly will follow later. So far the operational com-

mander has been General Su Yu, the principal organizer of the massive Communist offensive south across the Yangtze River in April and May, 1949. That offensive broke Nationalist mainland resistance and won Shanghai, Nanking, and the industrialized areas of the lower Yangtze Valley.

During the past eight months these forces have prepared for what the Communists describe as "the greatest offensive in modern Chinese history"—the assault on Formosa. Farmers from many areas of east China have been conscripted to build roads and airfields and to transport supplies. Large shipyards in the Yangtze Valley have been building or altering invasion vessels. Other craft are reported to have

been shipped by rail from north China and Manchuria to the Yangtze.

The Nationalists estimate that, in addition to their larger and more modern ships, the Communists are collecting about five thousand wooden junks. Many of these are heavily armed and carry fifty men each. Together with regular invasion barges, LST's, and ex-Nationalist naval vessels, these junks are believed adequate for transporting the forces considered necessary for the assault. The Communists have also trained in Shanghai a special cadre of political workers fully informed on conditions in Formosa.

It is difficult to predict how much Nationalist resistance these Communist forces might encounter on Formosa. The island's beaches are dotted with hundreds of concrete pillboxes. Miles of barbed wire have been strung along the coast. The Nationalist Navy and Air Force have been "streamlined." Many of the sailors and airmen are willing to fight the Communists, and their units will probably remain loyal so long as they have hopes of winning. An armored force commanded by Chiang Kai-shek's second son, General Chiang Wei-kuo, is equipped with more than one thousand light and medium tanks and about as many trucks. But Formosa has high mountains and many fast rivers, and engineers fear that the destruction of a few key bridges could immobilize most of the tanks not already waiting for repairs.

There are good reasons for doubting the ability and willingness of the ordinary Nationalist soldier to defend Formosa. A private soldier is paid the equivalent of seventy-five U.S. cents per month, is given his rice from a food allowance equivalent to two U.S. dollars per month, and must buy fuel, salt, vegetables, cooking oil, and, if possible,




meat. Eggs cost the equivalent of ninety cents a dozen, and other prices are on the same level, so it's not surprising that many soldiers are underfed. Medicines in warehouses often are not distributed, and soldiers have died from malaria because they lacked atabrine. Enormous quantities of supplies were lost to the Communists on the mainland last year, and the Nationalist ground forces now are critically short of several kinds of ammunition. These conditions exist despite the struggle of many junior officers to overcome the difficulties that have shackled the Nationalist armies for the last ten years.

The greatest military weakness of Formosa is the Nationalist high command. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek still promotes and demotes officers without telling their superior commanders. Several notoriously unsuccessful and corrupt generals have recently come back into favor. Other Chinese generals who might have helped to clean up the Nationalist establishment are kept busy wooing senior officials of SCAP in Tokyo. Since President Truman's announcement of U.S. naval intervention, important elements in the Nationalist Ministry of Defense have adopted an attitude of, "Let the Americans do it." Able young officers are haunted by the prospect that when an invasion comes, Chiang Kai-shek will continue his old practice of haphazard interference with established defense plans by giving direct orders to regimental commanders. If that happens it will wreck all chances of using the roughly 250,000 more or less well-trained combat troops on the island most effectively.

Last spring there was evidence of considerable good will toward the government among important elements of the Formosan population. The Nationalist officials on Formosa include some of China's ablest financiers, engineers, scientists, and administrators. With the help of ECA and American agricultural and industrial specialists they have made noticeable improvements. Land rents have been reduced to 37.5 per cent of the main crop. Rice production this year should reach 1,400,000 tons, which is equal to the peak achieved under the Japanese. Such reforms have been partly responsible for the Communist failure to win the allegiance of Formosan revolutionary groups. The

Formosans also are influenced by their fear of mainland ties that would reduce their standard of living to the level of the great majority of Chinese.

Since early June this "friendship" for the government has been largely replaced by widespread and growing resentment against the Nationalists' open and secret police methods. Chiang Kai-shek and some of his most influential advisers apparently are convinced that they lost the mainland part-



ly because their police control was not sufficiently thorough. The recently increased police activity has resulted in the execution of an unknown number of alleged Communist agents—most of them officials of Nationalist military organizations.

Police control has also been extended to the schools. The Generalissimo's elder son, the Russian-educated General Chiang Ching-kuo, commands an organization that has placed "professional students" in most classrooms to report on teachers and students. Fear and hatred are generated by these methods.

As they prepared to capitalize on the situation, the Chinese Communist planners originally failed to indicate how they planned to eliminate opposition from the Nationalist Air Force, with its more than 150 fighter planes. Now, however, it is known that the Reds have a vigorous and fast-growing air force. At last count Communist combat aircraft in central, south, and east China numbered about four hundred. These include Japanese wartime models, Russian-built conventional and jet-type planes, and fighter-bombers purchased from eastern Europe. It is not possible to estimate how many planes there are in northwest China

and Manchuria, where the Communists are running an extensive pilot-training program. With Russian assistance, they have rapidly expanded their air-warning and anti-aircraft establishments. Dozens of American and Japanese wartime airfields have been reconditioned. By using these airfields the Communists can base their planes in the remote interior beyond the reach of the Formosa-based fighters, and "stage" to the coast for quick strikes.

Any realistic appraisal of American chances on Formosa must also take account of possible direct Russian assistance to the Chinese Communists. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid was signed on February 14, 1950. It provides that if Japan or any power associated with Japan attacks China, Russia will "immediately render military or other aid with all means at its disposal."

The Chinese Communists have charged that use of the U.S. Navy to block their invasion of Formosa constitutes aggression. They have not yet claimed that Japan is involved. But to do so would require little more than another phrase in their propaganda. They have emphasized that the American action was taken without United Nations sanction. Their statements quoted at length from President Truman's January announcement that the United States would not interfere in China's internal affairs.

The original Chinese Communist plan is believed to have set September, 1950, as the invasion date for Formosa. However, the Communist leaders in Peking have rarely attempted a major task until they were confident of success. Their timetable may now depend

upon when they receive additional aircraft, and possibly submarines, to cope with U.S. naval units. If the attack does not start before late October, rough weather may force a delay of months.

Those who assume that our Navy and Air Force can easily halt such an invasion are probably not aware that the Nationalists have found the wooden junk one of the hardest of all vessels to sink. When their junks were hit by 40-mm. shells, Communist soldiers dived into the water and plugged the holes with canvas. American-built destroyer escorts that tried to ram the junks loosened their own plates and failed to damage the wooden vessels. When ten to fifteen heavily armed junks closed around a destroyer escort, the larger vessel sometimes was captured or put out of action.

The experience of American soldiers with Communist mass attacks in Korea gives us an inkling of what the U.S. Navy and Air Force will be up against in trying to halt an invasion by thousands of Chinese Communist vessels. The Chinese craft will furthermore be protected by a powerful air force of their own. Once the vessels that are not sunk reach Formosa, there will be very little that our Navy and Air Force can do about the assault. And with even a small number of Chinese Communist troops ashore, many things could happen; the struggle might turn into a free-for-all wherein the Formosans would seek to get rid of their mainland rulers and the Communists, too. In any event the outcome would be largely out of our control.

Capture of Formosa by the Chinese Communists despite American military opposition would have profound political and military consequences throughout Asia. In Asian eyes the United States already has been humbled by events in Korea. If our intervention on Formosa ends in disaster, many Asians' confidence in the United States will be completely shaken.

The possibility cannot be ruled out that once their reinforcements are in position in Manchuria, the Chinese Communists may follow the example of the United States and link the issue of Formosa with the war in Korea.

In view of these prospects, it is necessary to consider the alternative policies available to the United States. Our security demands that we not only

choose a sound line of action, but act.


The most obvious alternative is for the United States to withdraw its fleet and planes and permit the Chinese Communists to take Formosa. Apart from American domestic political considerations, such action would have serious consequences in Asia. It would hand the Chinese Communists a major propaganda point and confirm them in their belief that the United States is a "paper tiger." Many of the Chinese who still look to America for leadership would probably turn against us. It would also put the Communists on the island and further embitter many Formosans who feel that the United States wronged them once by giving their country to Chiang Kai-shek and his appointees after V-J Day. But such action could be made simple and quick and it would leave our forces free for use elsewhere. We would also retain some of our reputation in Asia for not seizing territory.

A second course of action would be for the United States to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek and his group as a government and encourage the Chinese Communists to accept at least interim American or United Nations control over Formosa. Substantial information indicates that to accomplish this it would be necessary to assure the leaders in Peking of representation in the United Nations after the Korean

issue has been settled. The Chinese Communists have argued they must have Formosa because it is Chinese territory. But a much more important reason is the presence on the island of the Nationalist régime blocking Peking's recognition in the world as the Chinese government. Once the Chinese Communists were assured of this "face-saving" gain, other factors might come into play in China that would encourage them to leave Formosa alone. The greatest of these is the enormous cost of the invasion. The recent disastrous floods in central China, foreboding another terrible famine next winter, should make this consideration even more important.

A third alternative would be for America to prepare for general war in Asia. If the United States continues to use its forces to protect the Kuomintang leaders on Formosa, there is ample evidence that Peking, at the opportune moment, will act as if we had declared war. Should the United States become involved in a "Korea-like war" with the Chinese Communists while the Soviet Union remained officially aloof, it would be difficult to estimate the consequences.

Chinese Communist reinforcements recently sent to Manchuria or en route there total about 250,000 men. In addition an "elite force" numbering





about 500,000 is supposed to be training in Manchuria, with the Russians providing specialized instruction and unknown quantities of equipment. The armies moved north include the most veteran units of the Chinese Red Armies—many of the troops that have been hardened by twelve years of constant fighting. It is reasonable to assume their combat efficiency will be at least equal to that of the North Koreans.

Meanwhile, the Communists have kept about 260,000 front-line troops in south China. Most of them could be made available to help Ho Chi Minh "liberate" Viet Nam, where they would outnumber French troops about two to one.

For the second or third alternative, the early movement of American ground forces to Formosa appears necessary. Information from the mainland indicates such action would at least delay the Communist invasion; it would force the Chinese Red generals who are contemptuous of the Nationalist military to remake their plans. Troops might also be useful in making the reforms necessary on Formosa if the threat of internal revolt is to be overcome. The Formosans are eager to participate in the defense of their island themselves. Some of them were conscripted into and trained in the Japanese Army. A new administration might find them useful.

Once genuinely within the western orbit, Formosa could be made to serve more important purposes than as a piece of Pacific real estate with military possibilities. More than any other area of equal size in Asia it offers an opportunity for creating at an early date a high standard of living for the average person. The island has great natural resources already partly developed. It has a literate population that is willing and able to work hard, and a high concentration of scientific and managerial talent, particularly among the mainlanders who have settled there. If the relatively small number of men on top who have blocked positive efforts departed, it is likely that great creative energies would be released. The United States then could help build the kind of show place in Asia that would be a powerful argument for what Americans want to offer.

—ALBERT RAVENHOLT

## Mobilization: Truman's Ideas



W. Averell Harriman

At a recent Pentagon briefing, a ruddy-faced colonel was doing his best to explain a mammoth chart of government organization.

"Say," a reporter called out, "can you give us a thumbnail sketch of what the National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board are supposed to do?"

"Sure I can," said the colonel. "The National Security Council tells you who you're going to fight, when and where. The National Security Resources Board tells you what you're going to fight them with."

A good many people in Washington have shared this admirably lucid but oversimplified notion about these two advisory bodies, which were set up under the National Security Act of 1947: the NSC to advise the President on matters pertaining to "the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security"; the NSRB to advise him con-

cerning "the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization." The two groups represented new departures for a nation which had never done much planning for war in times of peace. Because of their novelty and secrecy, rumors of what they were doing swirled around Washington—rumors which were fanned occasionally by speeches of NSC or NSRB spokesmen warning that in a future war M-Day (mobilization) and D-Day (actual involvement) would be one and the same. "For the first time in history," their argument ran, "we, in effect, share a common border with powerful enemies."

Early this year, *U. S. News & World Report* revealed plans allegedly drawn by the NSRB for taking over the civilian economy on M-Day. Embarrassed NSRB officials explained that the magazine had got hold of a working paper submitted by staff consultants—by no means an accepted plan of action. But suspicion died hard; few stories about the NSRB failed to convey the dramatic notion that within a few minutes after the outbreak of war, a man would appear at the White House with a batch of directives for the President to sign and issue, converting the national economy to war.

Those who believed the President was equipped with push-button machinery for converting the nation to push-button war must be deeply disappointed with the course of events in Washington since June 25. Mobilization has proceeded with anything but machinelike smoothness. For this, of course, the Russians are mostly to blame; they precipitated a type of war for which no one over here was planning. But this scarcely excuses the President's security advisers for the missing links in their planning. It is clear that the National Security Coun-

cil had never calculated our "objectives, commitments, and risks" in Korea; that the Military Establishment had not estimated the requirements for limited peripheral warfare; and that the NSRB had not thought out the degree of mobilization we would need to meet these requirements.

Instead, the President's security machinery had to be jammed into emergency operation *after* the fact. For two nights and days, top NSC members struggled over an answer to the specific problem of Korea and to related Asian problems. Twenty-four days passed before the President could give Congress an estimate of the Military Establishment's increased needs—an estimate which jumped from five billion to ten billion dollars within a week. Similarly, there was a good deal of hitching and halting before the NSRB's legal man and White House assistants could piece together a Defense Production Bill from the more sweeping legislation the NSRB had plotted out for the mythical M-Day. The legislation sent to the Hill was not as well drafted or supported as it should have been.

The President is said to have been disappointed by the failure of all his security advisers—not only the Central Intelligence Agency—to anticipate realistically the possibility of limited aggression. Disappointed or not, the President has clearly taken the initiative himself since he made the tough decision in the late evening hours of June 26. It was he who passed directly on what steps had to be taken to meet the demands of limited war—calling on his assistants to fill in the details. It was he who stood up against the demands for total mobilization now.

So far two lines of Harry Truman's thinking have become fairly clear.

First, he distinguishes sharply between requirements for limited war and those for general war. At present the United States is committed to limited war, and as long as it remains that way, the efforts to achieve the major aims of American foreign policy have to be renewed and intensified—not relaxed or scrapped. He is convinced that the battle is not just against Communism but for freedom, and the two main enemies of freedom are still misery and fear. Government policy at home and abroad must keep this aim foremost. That is why the President

has resisted the urgent pleas of Bernard Baruch and an excited Congress, why he has opposed the Senate's action in voting aid to Spain, and has insisted steadfastly that he will not make use of price-control and rationing powers unless they become necessary.

He does not want the country to go into total mobilization, only to have the Soviet Union relax its pressure temporarily and have us, as one observer puts it, "stretched out like an over-tight banjo so the Soviets can pluck at us till we crack." Of course, an out-



Charles Sawyer

break of general war in Europe would compel us to mobilize fully, but the transition from partial to total mobilization could be accomplished fairly swiftly, while demobilization might be disastrous.

Secondly, the President has definite ideas about how a war should be run—ideas he acquired from his unique experience as chairman of the special Senate committee on defense expenditures during the Second World War. These ideas, too, run counter to the Baruch approach, which would summon the war lords back to Washington to reopen their emergency agencies, well removed from the jurisdiction of the President. The difficulty of maintaining control over the hastily created agencies tormented Roosevelt recurrently. When asked recently for his attitude toward emergency agencies, President Truman replied that he had been working for five years to improve

the administrative setup of the government, and that he thought it was perfectly capable of handling the jobs it now faces.

Awaiting Congress's passage of the Defense Production Bill, the President prepared executive orders parceling authority for allocations and priorities to the existing agencies. The Departments of Commerce, Interior, and Agriculture were to get most of the job, each in its field. The Federal Reserve System would handle credit controls and serve as fiscal agent. Other agencies would be called in as it became necessary. Each agency would undoubtedly establish new divisions to organize controls; whether these would eventually be pulled out and consolidated into emergency agencies would depend to a large degree on how much additional control became necessary, and how well the old-line agencies met their increased obligations.

A problem which arises no matter how controls are enforced is what sort of direction and co-ordination will come from the top. A high official in one of the three departments assigned allocation and priority powers said recently: "Until we know who's going to tie the thing together, we will have a three-headed monster with Commerce, Interior, and Agriculture each pulling in a different direction."

Senator Truman was aware of this problem in 1941. The day before Pearl Harbor, he called on President Roosevelt to appoint a "defense works czar." "Unless a man with full authority will be placed at the head of the program," he said, "it will be swamped by waste and small business will crack up." On May 6, 1943, the Truman Committee reported that the basic weakness of the U.S. war effort lay in lack of control and too many independent "czars." Later that month, Roosevelt set up the Office of War Mobilization, making its director, James Byrnes, virtually Assistant President. So far, however, President Truman has not indicated whether or not he will appoint a "czar" of partial mobilization. According to some White House insiders, the President hopes that the Executive Office will be able to handle the job without great modification. For some time, he has been trying to "institutionalize" the Presidency. Unlike Roosevelt, who collected "passionately anonymous"

men and gave them vague assignments, Truman has been grooming a triumvirate of assistants—John Steelman, W. Averell Harriman, and W. Stuart Symington—and has divided some of his work load among them. Now that Symington has been appointed full-time chairman of the NSRB, with authority to report to the President without clearing with other members of the board, he should be able to iron out most mobilization problems in his regular NSRB conferences with the department heads concerned. Other problems could be handed over to John Steelman, officially titled Assistant to the President. If any further head-cracking had to be done, the President himself would do it.

This is the way mobilization should work, and in fact may work, so long as it is only limited. If, however, it proves slow in getting started, if unexpected boggles develop, or if the scale of requirements has to be increased suddenly, such a division of authority would hardly prove workable. In that case, the man for the czar's job will probably be determined by the testing process now going on. Steelman, Symington, or Harriman would be the likeliest choice, but Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer is a strong dark-horse candidate.

John R. Steelman has acquired a wealth of experience during both the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations. It was he who succeeded Byrnes as director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion—a position more powerful than anything presently contemplated. But Steelman is sometimes called the most overworked man in Washington today, not excepting the President himself. His job is to co-ordinate the normal operations of overgrown government and frequently to serve as trouble shooter in cases of labor strife. He was acting head of the NSRB until Symington was appointed, but found little time to devote to its direction. Should mobilization get bogged down, he will find it difficult to handle the co-ordinating job unless relieved of his other responsibilities. Also, although he is an affable man with a genius for cooling off hotheads, he does not seem equipped for the head-cracking duties that would fall to a czar.

Last April, when Symington came over from the Pentagon to the NSRB,

there was considerable speculation about his future. "Washington's No. 1 lobbyist is getting Washington's potentially most important job," one reporter remarked. Mainly, observers wondered what the President had promised Symington, an aggressive business executive, who sold the air program so adroitly to Congress last year that he got a larger appropriation than the President wanted. Symington has a reputation as a big-time operator rather than as a policy man. It seemed unlikely that he would be content in



John R. Steelman

a merely advisory job, which the President had always stipulated the NSRB chairmanship should be. Arthur M. Hill, the previous chairman, had been removed after trying to turn the NSRB into a sort of embryonic War Production Board.

Now that the NSRB head can advise the President in his own right without obtaining approval from the various Cabinet heads, a skillful chairman can exert a great deal of coercive authority over recalcitrant agencies participating in mobilization work. Symington may find that he can accomplish much of the necessary co-ordination simply because he can take matters straight to the President. It may be that before long the President will give Symington more direct authority to co-ordinate the work of the agencies. For the present Symington appears to be willing to bide his time.

Averell Harriman, a nervous, hard-

working ex-banker who arrived in Washington in 1934 to help run NRA, joined the White House staff last month as the latest of Truman's assistants. His job is to preside over the National Security Council when the President is absent and to pull together the various branches of government working in the field of foreign policy. Judging by his recent trip to Japan to confer with MacArthur, Harriman will also serve as the President's No. 1 trouble shooter abroad. His previous assignments, which range from Secretary of Commerce to Ambassador to Moscow, make Harriman an acceptable candidate for mobilization czar, but since his present job is primarily foreign policy, he might not be tried until Steelman and Symington have been given a chance.

Charles Sawyer, the Secretary of Commerce, is a candidate mainly because he would like to have the job and because industrial and power interests prefer that controls be administered by the Department of Commerce, if by anybody. A mild-mannered Cincinnati lawyer who came to Washington in 1948, he has quickly acquired empire-building habits to match those of any of the old-timers. Not long ago, in a Cabinet meeting, he sought authority to co-ordinate the awaited allocation and priority controls among the three departments—a bid for power quickly quashed by the other two Secretaries. Then industrial and power interests tried to give him this authority directly through a Senate amendment to the Defense Production Bill. Since one way or another the Department of Commerce will handle most of the controls anyway, Sawyer will certainly figure prominently for the time being. If mobilization goes badly, he may well end up as the whipping boy.

No account of the direction mobilization will take can leave out the actions of a freewheeling Congress like the present one. A tendency toward a reversal of Constitutional prerogatives is growing more and more accentuated: The Executive drafts most legislation; Congress, by means of riders and crippling amendments, endeavors to execute policy. It is to be hoped that in the months ahead the nation will not become the victim of Congressional attempts to assume executive responsibilities.

—DOUGLASS CATER



# Aggression Arouses the West

## Europe . . .

The Soviet-sponsored, Soviet-assisted aggression in Korea is well on its way to bringing about two reactions highly feared by the Soviets and most likely to stalemate their future expansionist plans: the evolution of the slowly forming Atlantic Community into a really united bulwark for peace, and the evolution of the United States' already powerful economy into one that will be able to turn out the maximum quantity of armaments without repressive civilian controls.

In February of this year, an estimate of Soviet capabilities caused great apprehension in some parts of Washington. It suggested, among other things, that by about 1954 the U.S.S.R. might have a stock of atomic bombs large enough, if delivered successfully, to cripple American industry, and that by about the same time the Soviet Union might have broken a bottleneck in the extraction and refining of petroleum products.

This estimate did not cast any new light on the intentions of Soviet policymakers. But it did mean that they might base their policy on some new assumptions: that the United States could be kept from putting its full industrial power into a war and that the U.S.S.R. would be able to fuel and oil its own war machine for an assault on western Europe.

Soon after this estimate came a series of provocative actions on the western margins of Soviet Europe. The most provocative was the shooting down of a U.S. Navy plane in the Baltic Sea. Some American officials began to fear that the U.S.S.R., feeling its new strength, would become careless about using it. Specifically, the Kremlin might decide to step over the line in some country not backed by western commitments—Turkey, perhaps, or Iran—in the belief that the Soviet Union could achieve peripheral gains without general war, and that the still



frail fabric of western unity might then begin to disintegrate.

By the time Secretary of State Acheson went to the meeting of the North Atlantic Council of Ministers last May, he felt that the most urgent task of the non-Communist world, and especially of western Europe, was to arm itself at greatly accelerated speed, in order to provide stronger deterrents to Communist initiative. For the time being, however, the Atlantic Ministers merely agreed—in principle—on a collective effort which ultimately might lead to the integration of the western defense establishments into something like a single fighting force.

In fact, the military organization of the West remained, as a Pentagon official had called it, "a can of worms." Europe's generals went on squirming to retain their own countries' sovereignties and their own individual defense forces. There were practical as well as emotional difficulties in the way: It would take more money than anyone seemed to have to convert the Netherlands, for instance, from a sea power into a land power. But most of all, perhaps, there was doubt in Europe

about the real danger, and about whether the United States would really make a maximum contribution to European preparedness, whether it would indeed fight for Europe, and whether its armed forces would get to the continent in time if the necessity ever arose.

Most of these doubts were dramatically resolved by the Soviet action in Korea. The danger has been demonstrated. The American reaction has saved months of discussion in Europe and months of debate in Congress. The net effect probably has been to advance by nearly a full year the time when the Atlantic Community could begin to deal with the necessity for greater speed.

As Secretary Acheson goes into the meeting of the Atlantic Council in New York, new arguments and a changed set of circumstances prevail. The Secretary speaks as a man who will have at his disposal \$3.5 billion of arms aid—on top of the billion previously allotted for this fiscal year—some of it to send American arms to the Atlantic partners, some of it equip the partners

themselves to manufacture modern matériel. Beyond that, as the Europeans know, the Administration is willing to contribute similar amounts for two more years.

What this prospect may mean can be illustrated forcefully in the case of the French. Washington is optimistic that new matériel can provide a will to resist aggression; the theory is given support by France's new proposal to man fifteen divisions.

Before President Truman's request to Congress for more arms aid, Prime Minister René Pleven had assured the Chamber of Deputies that France meant to have a fully balanced defense force of its own. Now the French are talking military internationalism. They want Atlantic forces to have a single leader, probably an American. They want America's defense contributions to go into a central pool which logically would finance an integrated defense effort.

Washington planners themselves look with favor on converting the aid program, now being carried out under a series of bilateral agreements between the United States on the one hand and the Atlantic partners on the other, into a single integrated effort. While welding European forces into a single defense system will still be a long and complex business, it should not now be anywhere so protracted and troublesome as it would have been without the unifying influence provided by the Kremlin.

Nor is the significance of this progress in Europe merely military. Washington sees an obvious and inescapable connection between the building of unified defense forces and other projects now proceeding in western Europe: the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, for consultative planning on economic progress; the Dutch, French, and Italian plans for expanded trade or integrated industry now being considered by OEEC; the Schuman plan for a common regulation of French, German, and Benelux resources of coal and steel production; the European Payments Union, for making the unhampered exchange of European currencies for European goods; and the Council of Europe, for international debate on political questions. The Atlantic military system will contribute to these efforts. It will help ensure that western Europe

shall become less and less vulnerable to all the weapons—military, economic, and political—that the U.S.S.R. might use against it.

## Washington . . .

Beyond any doubt, the American public understands the necessity not only of winning the war in Korea but also of doing everything possible to prevent a war in Europe. The latter is a large objective, and the public knows that it has to be won, fundamentally, by American industrial output, which alone can provide a military shield for European unity. But in rising eagerly to the support of Bernard Baruch's suggestion that the nation's economy ought to be put under stringent controls, the public rose to what the Administration thought was the wrong bait.

Most of the confusion arose from the fact that Washington officials—perhaps in deference to the black headlines from Korea—had not explained their own logic at any length. This oversight left many people free to conclude that June 25, 1950, was just like December 7, 1941, which it was not.

At the time of Pearl Harbor, the country had to proceed to an all-out mobilization from a situation in which it had a professional army about as big as Romania's, a Navy smaller than Japan's, and an air force so small that all its bombers would not have crowded a medium-sized airport. Beyond that, the American economy was still showing visible deficiencies left over from the great depression—old and relatively small plant capacity and large numbers of untrained and unemployed workers. To build new plants, to mobilize armies and muster manpower for total war, the government had to siphon gigantic amounts of material from civilian to military use, and to direct and control the flow of men and goods within tight margins.

In 1950, the United States has beyond question the world's biggest navy, although the force immediately available for the Korean operation was puny. Its air power is relatively impressive. On the ground, the United States and its Atlantic partners do suffer from marked inferiority to the Russians. But in the America of 1950, military preparedness does not by any means start from the virtual zero of 1941.

Nor does the problem extend to the infinity of total war. It involves our achieving a condition of readiness that will enable the United States, with its strengthened Atlantic partners, to withstand the first shock of a Soviet attack, and to protect the Atlantic Community for a period of further mobilization until an Allied advance could begin.

To reach that condition of readiness and to help its partners reach it, the United States has, by contrast with 1941, a national economy of almost fantastic strength. In productive power, it has no near rival in the world, and it is still expanding. Production, indeed, may continue to expand nearly fast enough to serve rising defense needs without immediate heavy deprivation of the civilian economy. Washington economists calculate that the output of all goods and services in the next twelve months will be at least seven or eight billion dollars' worth higher than in the previous twelve. In the meantime, fifteen billion dollars would be a high estimate of the new claims that military needs actually will make on the economy. The resulting deficit in civilian consumption would come to not more than seven or eight billion dollars—approximately three per cent of the gross national product.

To President Truman and his advisers, therefore, the problem seems much different than it has looked to wide portions of the public. With the vast and growing elbow room provided by the American economy, a great contribution to preparedness can be made without too much pushing and shoving. The task of government now, as understood in the White House, is not to manage the economy by an elaborate system of controls, as was done during the Second World War, but to let the economy go on growing with as few checks as possible. The controls the President means to use are simple: a priority-and-allocations system to ensure that essential work gets done, credit restrictions and new taxes to curb the advance of consumer purchasing power. And though by comparison with the planning for organizing the Atlantic Community now in process the President's mobilization policy has an almost casual look, it should serve to provide the underpinnings of peace.

—HAROLD N. GRAVES, JR.



Harris & Ewing  
Army: J. Lawton Collins



Harris & Ewing  
Air Force: Hoyt S. Vandenberg



Harris & Ewing  
Navy: Forrest P. Sherman

## Peace Breaks Out In the Pentagon

If a Navy or Air Force officer who had been transferred to the field from the Pentagon a year ago were to return now he might well conclude he was in the wrong place.

A year ago the Pentagon atmosphere was so charged with rumors, innuendoes, and accusations that it seemed the services were doing little except promoting their respective special interests, or trying to prove their rivals were engaged in ridiculous or downright nefarious activities. Motives were questioned and integrity was challenged as readily as one cocks a skeptical eye at the weatherman's latest forecast. Every Air Force move drew Navy scorn; every Navy move was suspected by the Air Force. Sinister purposes were read even into a reassignment of office space which put high Air Force brass at Secretary of Defense Louis E. Johnson's immediate left and relegated Navy brass to a more distant section of the huge building.

This sort of thing is almost entirely lacking at the Pentagon today. Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews is apt to be found discussing joint problems in the office of Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter, and vice versa. No longer is it unusual to see opposite numbers in the service hierarchies entertaining one another at their respective clubs. When Communist planes all but disappeared from the Korean skies, an admiral observed at a press briefing: "The B-29's have been working that area over pretty thoroughly." An Air Force colonel added that reconnaissance "showed the Navy did a very, very fine job indeed." Both observations were spontaneous and, apparently, sincere.

In Korea, it is not unusual to find Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine planes simultaneously providing close support for ground troops. When

the Navy perfected a 6½-inch anti-tank aircraft rocket, the first consignment went to the Air Force. When General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, made a flying trip to Japan, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, appeared on their behalf before Congress.

Underneath, an old Pentagon hand would discover that all is not quite as rosy as it seems. The Marine Corps still feels insecure and suspects an Army-Air Force plot to deny it the number of tactical air squadrons it believes it needs. The Air Force believes recent criticisms of its tactical air operations and its jet airplanes have been "Navy-inspired." Valuable time is lost in making representations about such matters both in Tokyo and Washington. Nevertheless, at the top—where unification probably counts most—there can be no doubt that a metamorphosis has taken place.

Officials who had experience in pre-Second World War mobilization declare that major decisions never have been made with such dispatch as they have since June 26. Commenting upon Moscow's slow reaction to American intervention in Korea, one high-ranking officer who had been a party to this and many extremely important subsequent decisions declared: "They must have been amazed at the speed with which we acted. I certainly was."

Speed has not been gained at the expense of unanimity. While one of the major sources of friction—the troublesome division of inadequate funds—has been missing since June 26, a large number of issues have arisen which, in a different atmosphere, could easily have grown into major controversies. There have been none.



What has brought about this happy state of affairs? In order of importance, the major factors seem to be: the bitter "unification" hearings of October, 1949, before the House Armed Services Committee; the appointment of Admiral Sherman as Chief of Naval Operations; the departure of W. Stuart Symington as Secretary of the Air Force and the succession of Finletter; and the creation of the "Joint Secretaries," a civilian counterpart of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The October hearings served as a catharsis, giving Navy officers a chance to get long-smoldering resentments off their minds; they brought out into the open fundamental professional differences which had not been aired effectively in interservice forums; they impressed upon Johnson and the Administration the strong political support still enjoyed by the Navy and Marine Corps in and out of Congress. Moreover, the bitterness engendered by them so alarmed thinking members of each service that it provided a new incentive for an attempt at understanding the others.

Unquestionably, the hearings marked the turning point. But a large measure of the credit for the salutary course of events since then is due to Admiral Sherman. Quickly but quietly, Sherman acted to remove both the surface and the underlying causes of dissension. Diehard naval opponents of unification were transferred from the Pentagon, and by firm action in the Crommelin case Sherman served notice that those who openly flouted his orders would be dealt with severely. His entire command plunged into a resolute campaign to secure a reversal of decisions which had contributed to the Navy's feeling of insecurity.

Since Sherman had been one of the authors of the original Unification Act, many Navy men feared he would be a "yes man." But word soon went out that Sherman's views on fundamental strategic questions coincided with those of the other admirals who had testified in October. He went to bat for the Navy and he delivered.

Friction within the Pentagon did not automatically disappear when Sherman took over the top Navy spot, and it was not long until one heard that "one more change must be made." There was little doubt that this change

would involve the Secretary of the Air Force. Stuart Symington had been the object of some of the most bitter and unfair attacks by naval officers before the October hearings. He found it difficult to forgive and forget. He had been one of the supersalesmen of unification, but as time passed he seemed to confuse opposition to Air Force points of view with opposition to unification. When the President shifted him to the National Security Resources Board and replaced him with Finletter, the Pentagon atmosphere improved at once.

Finletter is no less a disciple of "strength through air power" than Symington. As chairman of the President's Air Policy Commission of 1947, he was one of the main boosters of the seventy-group Air Force. But in his studies of the forces required for "survival in the air age," he had acquired a healthy respect for naval aviation, and had urged a much stronger Navy air arm. He was a team player, and he hit it off well with Matthews and the new Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace, Jr.

Matthews had come to the Navy from private law practice. As Director of the Budget, Pace had acquired a wide knowledge of the whole defense establishment. The three Secretaries found that "strictly Navy" or "strictly Army" questions often had ramifications in the other services and that joint discussion aided in rational solution of them. Soon they were meeting together daily—and sometimes several times a day. Moreover, they discovered a great weakness in the unification system: The voices of the civilians who were supposed to exercise control often were much weaker than those of the military. Because the Secretaries functioned separately, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were called upon to decide innumerable nonmilitary questions which properly might be assumed to be beyond the competence of military men.

Under the leadership of the aggressive, articulate Pace, the Secretaries (with Johnson's approval) decided to form the Joint Secretaries as a formal means of presenting the civilian view on military questions in the same way that the JCS presented the military view.

Nevertheless, it is evident that serious miscalculations were made before

## Civilian Chiefs



Harris & Ewing

Navy: Francis P. Matthews



Harris & Ewing

Air Force: Thomas K. Finletter



Harris & Ewing

Army: Frank Pace, Jr.

June 26 in the extent of our military preparedness. One reason for this was the "likeness of mind" which existed not only within the Department of Defense but throughout the Administration. At the risk of oversimplification, it could be said that the principal factors guiding pre-Korea defense policy were a general view that Russia would not have sufficient atomic bombs or other necessities for all-out war until 1954, thus affording us time for an "orderly" military expansion; a strong suspicion that "victory through bankruptcy" of the United States was the aim of the Kremlin; and an earnest desire to achieve a balanced budget while advancing the Fair Deal.

Recently some defense officials had guardedly suggested that our military establishment was inadequate. In February, Matthews told the House Appropriations Committee that Navy professionals felt the forces provided by the \$13 billion 1951 defense budget were "below those essential to meet mobilization requirements without a degree of risk." In May, General Vandenberg decried the "false impression" that calculation "somehow reduces the risk," and said he knew of no military calculation which indicated the risk was decreasing. "If the build-up of Russian equipment continues," he said, "we will be confronted in a very few years by a force that easily could overwhelm such defenses as we are able to muster today." Before June 26, in connection with the preparation of the military budget for fiscal 1952, a moderate expansion of the armed forces was being discussed. But the record reveals only one occasion in the last three years on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense seriously urged a significantly larger military establishment. This was in the fall of 1948, after Czechoslovakia had fallen to the Communists and when the Berlin airlift was in full swing.

While the military budget for fiscal 1951—scaled from \$16.9 billion down to \$14.2 billion—was still being considered by the House, the late Secretary James V. Forrestal resigned and was succeeded by Johnson. In July, long before the Senate had acted, President Truman established a military budget ceiling of \$13 billion. Johnson accepted this limit wholeheartedly and launched upon his economy drive.

First came the "crash" program to "phase down" 1950 forces to the level to be allowed in 1951. Then there followed a "management-control" program intended to reduce duplications and promote efficiency. In fairness to Johnson, a clear distinction should be made between the two. His most serious mistakes probably were made in the first phase. In the second phase, a hundred million dollars a year was saved by requiring the Army and Air Force to adopt the Navy's system of cash payments for enlisted men's clothing; thirty million was saved by taking thirty thousand needless passenger vehicles off the road; 170,000 civilian employees were fired; and fifty major installations were closed. That lasting results were achieved is suggested by the fact that probably no more than 240,000 additional civilians and not



Harris & Ewing

#### Defense: Louis E. Johnson

more than half of the closed installations will be required now to support a much larger military effort.

Relatively speaking, we were well prepared for Korea. That is to say that we were less unprepared than we would have been against an attempt on Iran, for example. It was the one place in the world where we at least had some capability of resisting aggression. We

had four Army divisions and more than five hundred airplanes in Japan and nearby, and we had a small naval force in western Pacific waters. Considering that basic foreign policy had not anticipated intervention in Korea and that the military had not been forewarned that it might have to support such a move, the services responded admirably. Events in Korea nevertheless demonstrated strikingly that Johnson grossly exaggerated the true state of affairs when he said our defense was "sufficient unto the hour."

Lives and equipment were lost in the early stages of the Korean war because commanding officers had to commit their entire forces to the line, having no reserves to cope with Communist infiltration. At least two of the Army divisions in Japan had only two battalions to the regiment instead of three. When MacArthur asked for a full division of Marines, he could be supplied with only a reinforced regiment. Divisions at home had to be stripped to build up those at the front and those alerted for action, so that in a very short time next to nothing remained of our much-talked-about "mobile striking force." Only one aircraft carrier was available for the western Pacific when at least three were needed. Early air operations revealed deficiencies in the training of pilots for the support of ground troops, and not until the fighting in Korea was well along did the Army begin a serious effort to train American soldiers in defense against Russian-type infiltration and envelopment tactics. In ground and in lives lost, we paid dearly for years of stringency in Army procurement, particularly of antitank weapons.

There is good reason to believe that we now are profiting from these mistakes. Perhaps there also is reason to hope that if another period of uneasy peace follows the Korean war, the new-found harmony at the Pentagon will produce a wiser balance between the forces than seemed to exist on June 26. Yet in their zeal for co-operation, our civilian and military leaders must retain independence of thought. Competition should continue, but it must be regulated competition that bears as little resemblance to 1949's backbiting as it does to the dead nonproductivity of one hundred per cent harmony.

—VANCE JOHNSON

# How Effective Is Our Intelligence?



When the United States is taken badly unawares, as it was in Korea—and earlier at Pearl Harbor and the Battle of the Bulge—the first fall guy is bound to be our intelligence service. The latter includes, of course, the intelligence operations of the State, Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments, and those of the relatively new Central Intelligence Agency, all of which produce what is technically known as high-level foreign positive intelligence.

In plain language this "intelligence" is nothing more than the knowledge that our highest officials must possess about other countries. When it is full and accurate, these officials have the basic ingredient of national security; when it is not, they are likely to jeopardize our fate out of sheer ignorance. This knowledge must encompass history, geography, economics, and politics. It must include data on the things that do not change, such as a country's terrain; data on things that are continually changing, such as its military establishment or its economic life; and above all, it must include reasoned estimates of what is likely to happen at

some specified future time. When this knowledge enables our leaders to foretell the rough outlines of the possible and the probable, they possess the first requisite for a foreign policy worthy of the name. In the matter of Korea, it looks as if our high-level foreign positive intelligence did *not* foretell exactly what was going to happen and when.

There are three main techniques by which an intelligence service might have made an estimate of what was brewing and when the broth would boil.

First, on the assumption that the North Korean government did not begin its unannounced attack without the permission of, or instructions from, Moscow, there must have been some secret communications between the two capitals. They could have gone by radio, telephone, or telegraph, by pouch, or by confidential courier. If they went by any of these routes they probably contained pretty exact information upon what was to be done and at what time. The interception of such messages is a technique that intelligence services have used with success in the past. Upon occasions ciphers have been cracked, confidential pouches rifled, and couriers kidnaped. But the business of reading the other man's mail is extremely difficult and extremely hazardous—difficult because all his skill is centered on keeping you from doing just that, and hazardous because if he catches you he catches you in a very unfriendly act. Clandestine interception as an intelligence method is so tough and dangerous a game that peace-loving peoples have upon occasion unilaterally and more or less publicly renounced it.

Second, there is the technique of espionage, which usually accompanies the former method and sometimes supersedes it in effectiveness. At the

Rover-Boy level, your spy is the other man's Minister of Foreign Affairs or Chief of Staff. At lower levels your spies range from important and trustworthy men with good contacts down to thoroughly untrustworthy characters who have spied in the past and will spy in the future for anyone able to pay. Often this lowest category of professional works for both sides until caught at it—and then he works no more.

The difficulties of building an efficient espionage system are likewise great. You must recruit men and women intelligent and well trained enough to know the importance of a seemingly trivial fact when they encounter it, and men and women wise enough to ask the right person the right question in the right way and be able to understand and transmit the highly technical answer when they get it. The would-be spy must have a natural or carefully contrived "cover" occupation under which he can learn the other man's secrets without revealing his mission. When you are finally ready to place your man, you must then provide communications for him. This is a final and almost overpowering obstacle. If he uses the communications of your official foreign mission (embassy, legation, consulate, or other) and is uncovered, his activities may prove to be a major embarrassment to the conduct





of your foreign relations all over the world. Other communications are so difficult to establish or so risky you may not feel able to try them.

It goes without saying, then, that successful espionage systems are built up not in months and years, but literally over decades and even centuries. If the United States possesses an espionage system, and if it fell short in Korea, the most logical explanation lies with our newness to the game. We had no national espionage service as such until the Second World War.

The third technique by which intelligence may work can be called the overt technique. Over the long pull this technique is by all odds the most workable and useful. No social or political entity the size of a modern state can hide its physical self, nor can it stay alive without telling its citizens what it wants them to know and do. The nature of its climate, terrain, communications system, and general economic and political structure is almost unavoidably public property, and a government obviously cannot keep secret what it wants its citizens to do and what its official attitudes are. A country's press and radio, its published laws, and its foreign policy, taken with a knowledge of its physical being and its history, will often reveal important courses of action to come. For instance, during the last war the Japanese, probably by way of building home morale, told their people over the radio what splendid airplane fuel they were able to make out of pine roots or some such improbable substance. What they unavoidably told their enemy's overt intelligence was that they had run out of gasoline.

By the same token, a staff of trained people in South Korea, and perhaps another staff in Washington, could read the North Korean press, listen to that country's radio programs, listen to Moscow's programs devoted to or beamed at North Korea, talk with people who are getting letters or receiving visitors from North Korea—could, in short, use all the research techniques known to social scientists the world over.

But the overt intelligence technique is not easy just because it is open, and it will not unlock *all* the other man's secrets.

In the first place, it requires its practitioners to wade through an uncounted myriad of data—relevant, irrelevant,

slanted, falsified, out of date, and elliptical. Without the practitioner's background knowledge of languages, research techniques, disciplines of study, and so on, the welter of data is not much more than a jumble of nonsense.

There are many important secrets that the overt technique cannot reveal. The North Koreans could not have concealed the rough outlines of their bellicose posture if they had tried their utmost. The discerning of this posture is about as much as could have been



expected of the overt intelligence technique. So long as the North Koreans kept the precise details of the time, weight, and place of their attack out of the press and off the air, overt intelligence could only make reasoned speculations about these matters.

Over the long pull, then, the overt technique may give us most of what we need to know; over the short pull it may let us down disastrously. Only when it is augmented and supported by other techniques can we expect to enjoy reasonable security.

Even the best intelligence cannot give the basis for perfect security. It cannot because the men who have to make the ultimate decisions—the President, his Cabinet, key members of Congress, and

the Joint Chiefs of Staff—can never be absolutely certain that the findings of even the best intelligence are absolutely correct. In this fact we find a likely reason for our being apparently caught off guard on the 38th parallel.

Let us begin with the possible frailties of the best intelligence. In a free society in which individuality and independent opinion are the keystones, there are almost invariably two or more evaluations of a set of data and two or more interpretations of its meaning. Any important situation is generally complicated, and therefore the most that intelligence can do is to choose one interpretation and argue more strongly for it than for a second. But the second, and even a third and fourth, are there. They are implicit in those invariable "possibles," "probables," and "not impossibles" that sprinkle every intelligence estimate.

In the Second World War there was a situation during which intelligence reported a certain aspect of enemy strength with almost perfect exactness. Certain officers read these reports, and for what was nothing more than whimsy parading as judiciousness, chose to doubt their accuracy and impugn the source. The whimsical doubters won adherents. Thus there came into existence a second point of view that sober and studious men had to overcome before they could act on the basis of the reports.

The next thing to consider is that final decisions on action are not taken by intelligence, but by the people responsible for policy and operations. These men are the consumers of intelligence. Suppose that you are Mr. Truman or Mr. Acheson, and the situation is that of Korea in the fortnight before the invasion. You are sure that relations between North and South Korea are tense, you know that the Soviet Union is capable of needling the North Koreans into action, and you are certain that you do not want this to happen.

One morning intelligence gives you an estimate that trouble will begin in twenty-four hours. At first you may feel like taking immediate and irrevocable steps. Your next reaction is to wonder about the accuracy of intelligence. You realize that the North Koreans might want to mislead you into thinking that they were about to attack so that you would take what the world would con-

strue as an aggressive attitude, thus playing straight into their hands. You also realize that some South Koreans, tired of the local situation, might want to liquidate it by getting you embroiled at no matter what cost. These South Koreans might have planted misinformation with your overt observers or clandestine agents. Other knowledge from other intelligence sources might confirm your doubts. Your decision is not easy, and if you delay in taking the untraceable step, it should be understandable to your fellow citizens.

Now this sort of thing could happen even if our top-drawer foreign positive intelligence were at a peak of perfection. Those of us who saw our intelligence apparatus at its wartime best, and also saw what happened to it in the first postwar year, may be permitted some reasonable doubt as to its present stature.

To begin with, as of mid-1945 we possessed, in our military intelligence, in our Office of Strategic Services, and in some of our other war agencies, a fine national intelligence arm. It had developed a host of new analytical skills and techniques. It possessed a vast storehouse of general information on every conceivable topic, much of it systematically filed and indexed. It had established and was maintaining a myriad of sources for new information. It had secure communications. It had foretold German tank and oil production with uncanny accuracy. It knew as much about Japanese merchant-ship losses and the strength of the Japanese air force as the Japanese themselves.

It was a sad experience to see this mechanism not demobilized but demolished, to paraphrase General Marshall's remark on our military establishment. This happened first of all because Americans did not face up at once to their postwar responsibilities. They mistakenly considered an intelligence system one of the tools of war, and the tools of war and the number of warriors were to be reduced to a size that conformed to an isolationist Senator's guess as to what constituted our national security. A first-rate intelligence service, not merely a Central Intelligence Agency, was a basic requirement for a power carrying our world responsibilities, but this point was hard to sell to the voters and to



Congress. It was hard to sell to some important officers of the executive branch of the government. The State Department, under Mr. Byrnes, almost destroyed what could have become its first effective intelligence setup. General Marshall and Mr. Acheson tried to repair the damage, but the task was not easy. After Mr. Byrnes's fateful decision, the budget people and the appropriations committees of Congress made a rebuilding to strength impossible.

Meanwhile the armed services gave their intelligence branches no more than prorated shares of drastically reduced budgets, putting no higher premium on intelligence as a peacetime security device than they had before. Nor had the calling of intelligence won the prestige it deserved. Able officers continued to look upon an assignment to intelligence almost as a blot upon their records, because they knew that such an assignment—no matter how brilliantly filled—would have little or no effect upon promotion.

To be sure, the Central Intelligence Agency came into being officially with the National Security Act of 1947, and it received all the funds it requested from Congress. But dollars alone cannot build an intelligence team overnight. Dollars alone cannot bring back the disillusioned expert on Korea, the East Indies, or the international oil situation who quit Intelligence Service X or Y when his staff was cut down in 1946 to three unfirable incompetents from the permanent Civil Service list.

He went back to his business, his law office, his museum, or his university with a heavy heart.

In these terms, if our intelligence was at a peak of perfection in early 1950, there is room for surprise and self-congratulation. If this was the case any errors that may have been committed were those of judgment, not those of ignorance. But if our knowledge of the situation in Korea was faulty because our intelligence work was poor, whom are we to blame? Not the real professionals in the intelligence services, who are the ones most likely to have been aware of the shortcomings of their staffs and the most insistent that remedies be taken at once. We should be almost equally charitable toward those now in intelligence who were put there because they belonged to the correct branch of the armed services, had the correct rank, and were *available*, even though they knew almost nothing of intelligence work, and disliked what they had heard of it.

We should be a lot less charitable toward the people who assigned such men to intelligence. Personally I would not be at all charitable toward our fellow citizens, their representatives in Congress, and their officers in the executive branch of the government who never bothered to find out that knowledge is power, that the goal of intelligence is the production of the most powerful kind of knowledge, and that dollars and efforts spent on intelligence in peacetime can purchase a higher quantum of national security than any others. —SHERMAN KENT

## The Puerto Ricans: Slum to Slum



Puerto Rico, one of the most densely populated places in the world, is a land of perpetual spring and of a perpetual poverty that makes the name "Rich Port" a mockery. Columbus, the first European to touch the island, stopped there for water on November 19, 1493, during his second voyage in search of a passage to India. After he got back to Spain, the Queen asked him what the newly discovered island looked like. He crumpled up a piece of paper, threw it down on a table, and said, "It looks like this."

Columbus was illustrating Puerto Rico's greatest natural drawback—its rugged, mountainous terrain. The rectangular island, which is about one hundred miles long and thirty-five miles wide, has an area of 3,435 square miles, only about half of which is capable of cultivation. On every square mile of the total an average of more than six hundred human beings try to make a living.

About fifteen years after Columbus arrived, Juan Ponce de León, later the first Florida booster, was permitted by Haiti's governor to look for gold in Puerto Rico's mountains, and to conquer the island for His Spanish Majesty from the twenty-thousand-odd Borinquén Indians who inhabited it. Soon after the arrival of Ponce de León and his companions, exploitation by foreigners began with a vengeance.

The Spaniards forced the Indians into labor bands and killed them when

they rebelled, while others died of the rigors of slavery and the diseases imported by their conquerors. By 1570 the Spaniards had managed to exhaust the gold mines, after getting only about four million dollars out of them. The Puerto Rico garrison then wanted to move on to Mexico and Peru, where gold and silver were plentiful. But the Madrid government saw the little Caribbean island as a good base for the Spanish Empire. The colonizers were ordered to remain; African slaves had been brought in to do their dirty work. Failing to find enough gold, the Spaniards concentrated on sugar, ginger, molasses, coffee, tobacco, and hides. They were joined by small numbers of Portuguese, French, Corsicans, and Dutch. Breeding with the Indian natives and the African importations, the Europeans created a tangled thicket of racial backgrounds.

Under Spain, education of the natives was neglected and social welfare ignored. Treated as peons, deprived of self-government, the Puerto Ricans became resentful of foreign domination and still are. After the United States found itself in possession of Puerto Rico following the Spanish-American War, the natives were gradually tied closely by economics, advertising, and movies to the culture of the mainland.

During the half century of American control, Puerto Rican agriculture has become big business, with sugar the dangerously predominant crop. Coffee, second in importance until hurricanes destroyed the plants, is now outranked by tobacco. Capital from the mainland was invested in the island, and exploitation of the land became a corporate enterprise. In addition, the "continentals," as the Puerto Ricans call us, developed foreign trade, mostly with the United States, introduced a few manufacturing enterprises, and encouraged Puerto Rican handicrafts.

Since 1898, when the United States took over, Puerto Rico's population has more than doubled. The latest census estimates that there are 2,200,000 Puerto Ricans on the island today. At the present rate of increase it is expected that there will be at least 2.6 million by 1960. Puerto Rican women breed earlier and continue to do so longer than most, and they have very little access to contraceptives.

The struggling, poverty-stricken Puerto Ricans badly needed an outlet. At the end of the nineteenth century the first Puerto Ricans came to New York. They established themselves on Cherry Street, in the midst of the slums of the lower East Side, where they made cigars. In 1917 and 1918 came First World War workers, many of whom went back to the island after the armistice. The first recorded organized emigration of Puerto Ricans to New York occurred in March, 1920, when the American Manufacturing Company of Brooklyn brought in 130 women. Puerto Ricans have settled in the Red Hook and Navy Yard sections of Brooklyn ever since. During the 1920's, Puerto Ricans found greater opportunities on Manhattan Island than on their native island, but as soon as the





fierce depression of the 1930's set in, they began going back home again. Then came the development of airplane traffic, which has had a greater effect on relations between Puerto Rico and the mainland than any other single factor. Now that they are six hours rather than six days away, Puerto Ricans, who were granted full American citizenship rights in 1917, can fly into the United States for as little as thirty-five dollars a head. Since passage of the quota system that was established in 1924, the Puerto Ricans have been able to come into the United States in unlimited numbers.

Many other Americans resent the fact that Puerto Ricans are automatically citizens, and treat them with the suspicion and contempt visited on the Irish during the first half of the nineteenth century and on the Italians and Jews later. The descendants of these earlier immigrants, together with the Negroes, tend to take out their prejudices on the Puerto Ricans, who arrive in New York with only the advantage of vitality. Most of them, even those of predominantly Spanish blood, have darker skins than most other New Yorkers. Many of them know no English, which is a source of contempt and humiliation as well as the greatest handicap in getting jobs and finding their way through the metropolitan maze. And then, too—as though further to arouse the suspicious inhabitants of the five boroughs—the Puerto Ricans can vote.

Some crooked political leaders have bought Puerto Rican votes in close local elections. Some shrewd politicians have found it profitable to cater to the needs of the Puerto Ricans in order to win their votes. Fiorello H. La Guardia, when he represented the Congressional district in East Harlem, a seat now held by his protégé Vito Marcantonio, did all he could in Congress and out to help and to woo Puerto Ricans, who settled in that area in the 1920's because the decaying houses there could be rented more cheaply than those elsewhere.

Many New Yorkers firmly believe that Marcantonio has flocks of Puerto Ricans flown in shortly before registration time, gets them on relief, and votes them early and often. At the lowest fare charged by the various independent airlines, it would cost Marc-


antonio thirty-five thousand dollars to bring in one thousand voters, and it would take many more than that to swing an election in his district. He hasn't that kind of money.

Every two years, when Marcantonio runs for re-election, some newspapers concentrate on the "Puerto Rican problem" as a stick to beat Marcantonio, whose fellow-traveling with the Russians they resent. During these election campaigns special-feature writers manage to convey the impression that every Puerto Rican is a thief, who sits around all day in filth smoking marijuana, and is a source of infection, physical and spiritual, for the entire New York community.

The Puerto Ricans, in whom a dependent colonial status has bred shy suspicion, are deeply hurt by these slurs. They and the social workers who try to help them know that most Puerto Ricans in New York are clean, orderly, hard-working, and self-supporting. One social worker told me: "I do not deny that there are Puerto Ricans who are no good; I do not deny that there are Puerto Ricans who peddle dope, who are dirty, who steal. But I do deny that these are Puerto Rican traits any more than they are Irish, Jewish, Italian, or Negro traits. The same charges were once leveled against them. The Puerto Ricans are just the latest scapegoats because they were the last to arrive."

Nobody knows just how many Puerto Ricans there are in New York. Newspaper articles on the subject have printed estimates as high as 710,000.

The writer who added that extra ten thousand to his startling round number might just as well have made it another 26,452. The Department of Welfare doesn't ask recipients of its relief whether they are Puerto Ricans, but it estimates that there are approximately seventeen thousand cases involving about thirty-five thousand Puerto Ricans to whom it gives assistance. Calculating these as roughly ten per cent of the Puerto Ricans in New



York, the department arrives at the figure of 350,000, which it does not pretend is scientific. Sociologists connected with Columbia University who have made a study entitled *The Puerto Rican Journey*, published this month by Harper, made surveys in the two principal areas of Puerto Rican settlement in New York—East Harlem and the East Bronx. Their estimates say that the number of Puerto Ricans in New York in 1948 was between 160,000 and 200,000. The Welfare Council of New York in 1948 estimated that there were 210,000. Everybody concerned is eagerly awaiting the final figures of the 1950 census. For the first time in the history of the census the enumerators were instructed to ask whether inhabitants were Puerto Ricans. Those figures should be more scientific than the more lurid ones preferred by the *Daily Mirror*, the *World-Telegram and Sun*, and the *Daily News*.

It is not disputed that more than ninety per cent of the Puerto Ricans in the United States are congregated within the five boroughs of Greater New York. Before coming to the big town, the Puerto Rican has heard a lot from relatives and friends who have returned to the island, or has read their letters about life in New York. When he finally takes the airplane ride and appears with his small belongings in the slums where his predecessors have settled, and willingly take him in, the real city turns out to be much harsher than the city of his imagination.

According to *The Puerto Rican Journey*, "The typical Puerto Rican migrant, living in New York City's Spanish Harlem or the lower Bronx, is 24 years of age, has completed about six years of schooling, comes from an urban area on the island and had always lived in such an area. The chances are six to four that the migrant is white, seven to three that she is married. We say 'she' because it is six to four that the migrant is female. In the wage worker stratum, it is about even odds that the typical migrant worked as a semi-skilled laborer. . . ."

There are more Puerto Rican women than men in New York because their skill at needlework is in demand in the world's largest garment center. The fact that Puerto Rican women can get jobs more easily than men creates social problems, since it is an old Spanish

custom to keep the woman of the family in rigid, guarded seclusion. For many years, what is called "consensual marriage," the equivalent of our common-law marriage, has been prevalent among a great many poverty-stricken Puerto Ricans. According to the 1940 census, 26.4 per cent of all married women were in this status. Farmers and laborers marry that way, but business and professional people do not. It's a matter of money.

A woman married consensually three or more times in succession does not regard herself as promiscuous, nor is she so regarded by her neighbors. The latest husband usually takes care of the children, sometimes with the financial aid of his predecessors, for Puerto Ricans have a strong tradition of helping one another and they are fond of children.

A consensual marriage entails all the obligations of a formal union, and some Puerto Ricans shake their heads at the lax morals of New Yorkers. When their women come to New York and get jobs in its sewing shops and small factories or as domestic servants, they quickly become accustomed to their new independence. One Puerto Rican woman in New York boldly told a social worker: "Whether I have a husband or not, I work. So I do what I want, and if my husband dare to complain, I throw him out." A Puerto Rican man said: "Women get lost with the liberty they have up here, and many—not all—become bitches."

Since so many of the mothers go out

to work, the children are left more on their own in New York than on the island. "Children here grow up as bandits," parents complain. "They cannot be scolded or punished. A child takes you to court if you beat him. The judge believes more to a child than to you." The children learn English in New York's schools. All but two public schools in Manhattan and a majority of those in Brooklyn and The Bronx have Puerto Rican pupils. They frequently act as interpreters for their Spanish-speaking parents and sometimes look down on or are ashamed of parents who can't speak English, often take part in discussion of family problems, and sometimes add to those problems by indulgence in the juvenile delinquency they rapidly pick up from their fellow residents of the slum areas.

The Puerto Rican pilgrims who fly in every day, escaping from tropical hovels into metropolitan slums, face opportunities and temptations greater than any they have ever encountered. It takes a hardy, industrious, patient worker or a shrewd, unscrupulous racketeer to survive. Some of the Puerto Ricans can't endure the change and go back home to a less prosperous but more tranquil life; others are gradually seeking opportunities and settling in the less crowded communities of the United States; but the majority, like other visitors in search of fortune and excitement, catch the contagion of New York and do not want to leave.

—M. R. WERNER

(This is the first part of a two-part article.)



## Australia's Menzies—Friend in Need

Robert Gordon Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister who lately visited Washington and New York, is an Australian version of the liberal-conservative. In American terms (which are really rather irrelevant in Australia) he stands well to the left of Senator Taft and only triflingly to the right of a sensible Truman Fair Dealer. Political success for Australian conservatives can only come from a sane adaptation to the powerful leftist currents that usually run in that country.

The process of adaptation has been going on for many years. An Australian liberal-conservative accepts the welfare state—indeed, he both increases its benefits and elaborates its services, as the current Government is doing—but he rejects the “western socialism” of the Labour Party and the powerful trade unions. He talks free enterprise, but in the Australian context, so that what he says hardly means what it does in the United States. He accepts, since he has to accept the history of his country, the established socialization of services in Australia—the railways, streetcar lines, telephones, telegraphs, electricity, gas, radio—but he usually rejects further socialization in these fields. He is firmly against the socialization of banking (aside from the central bank) and against the socialization of commodity production. He believes that economic dynamism is only to be found in private enterprise in commodity production, and he sees in socialism not progress to a higher level of social welfare, but an outlook and program sure to make the country muscle-bound, static, and, in the long run, dead.

As Australian Labour aims through socialization to achieve security, leisure, and a rather limited abundance, the Australian liberal-conservative aims to achieve progress and welfare—including government-managed welfare schemes—on the basis of private enter-

prise. On both sides, however, the grill is mixed. The Australian mind has not, generally speaking, hardened into fanaticism either way, as the swing of party fortunes clearly shows. Having fought most of the Second World War under Labour leadership and given Labour a chance to reveal and partly implement its peacetime program, the



Prime Minister Menzies

electorate swung over last December and put the opponents of Labour in power. It did not, however, destroy Labour, as some strongly anti-socialist American commentators have implied. The party remains politically and industrially powerful. It will come back to office one day. After all, it is the only existing political alternative to liberal-conservatism.

Meanwhile, Menzies is once more Prime Minister. Son of a country storekeeper, he was born in the town of Jeparit in the Mallee region of Victoria on December 20, 1894. After an ordinary public-school education, Men-

zies had a brilliant university career, carried off prizes, and graduated with honors in law. He was called to the Victorian bar in 1918 and quickly became known as a chap who would go far (the highest Australian praise). He did go far professionally, becoming especially well known for his arguments in constitutional cases before the High Court of the Commonwealth and the Privy Council, London. He “took silk”—became a King’s Counsel—in 1929. He could have gone on to become one of the really big earners at the bar, but he chose to turn to politics.

Menzies was elected to the upper house of the Victoria state legislature in 1928, but after a year he found the real road to political success and won a seat in the lower house, which he held for the five years following. He held Cabinet office almost from the moment he entered politics—an indication of the esteem in which he was held by his party associates. Within five years he rose to be Deputy Premier of the State of Victoria, then shifted to Federal politics to repeat his climb at that level. Entering the Federal House of Representatives in 1934, he was made Attorney-General in 1935, and quickly established himself as a leading figure in his party. When Prime Minister Joseph A. Lyons died in April, 1939, Menzies succeeded him as Prime Minister and leader of the United Australia Party. Thus in a little more than a decade from his entry into politics, Menzies was Prime Minister of Australia. He was only forty-four.

Unluckily for him, his hold on power was insecure. His succession to leadership of the United Australia Party broke up its alliance with the smaller Country Party, the two ordinarily forming the conservative coalition required to outvote Labour. Menzies could not command the following of the Country Party for various reasons, including a sharp difference of opinion





over the social services, which Menzies wanted to expand. Menzies therefore had to govern as head of a minority party in the House, supported, out of irreducible self-interest, by the Country Party in the clinches. Labour's political strength in the country was then waxing. The conservatives had been in office since 1932, and were rapidly wearing out their welcome. They had no program; internal dissensions made them inefficient as managers. The consciousness that the conservative hold on office was slipping forced the Country Party to change its leadership and team up with Menzies once again, but this did not save the situation. After the general election of 1940 the balance of power in the House of Representatives was in the hands of two "independents." The conservatives and Labour had an equal number of votes.

Finally, in September, 1941, dissension within his own Cabinet drove Menzies from office. He was succeeded

by Arthur Fadden of the Country Party, who lasted but thirty-seven days when he fell before Labour. Thus it came about that Labour was in power when the war in the Pacific broke out. It continued in power for eight years, during which conservative fortunes went from bad to worse. The Country Party under Fadden managed to hold on, but Menzies's United Australia Party disintegrated. It was dissolved in 1944 and replaced by the Liberal Party. It was the Liberal Party, led by Menzies, allied with Fadden's Country Party, that won the election of 1949. Menzies therefore returned to power with a political history that included a meteoric rise to supreme power, an experience of disloyalty among his colleagues that forced him from office, a sharp and long-lasting deterioration of party fortunes, and at least five years of slow, hard party work to climb back to the Prime Ministry of the Commonwealth.

In the old days before the war it was the common opinion that Menzies was too clever for his own good, and that he had far less sufferance for fools (of whom he seemed to detect a surprising number among his political associates) than is at all wise in a politician. Obviously clever people have a rough time in Australia; they must expect to be described with singular contempt by the mysterious phrase "too clever by half"; and Menzies as a politician suffered in full measure from this hostility to his kind. He was not, as an Australian politician should be, "fair average quality," but special; worst of all, he knew it.

A less rugged personality than Menzies would have thrown in the towel and quit the game. Menzies no doubt had bitter moments indeed as he saw old opponents like Dr. Herbert Evatt ride the Labour tide, garner the fruits of office, and win world-wide fame, but he stuck it out and came back. Moreover, he is not now the heir to power, as he was as successor of Lyons, but the builder of it as creator and leader of the Liberal Party. He worked hard at the building, showing at every turn that he had learned from misfortune.

Menzies's policies and problems are fairly clear. In foreign policy he must find a way to ensure Australia's security at a time of uncertainty in closely

neighboring Asia. When the new Minister of External Affairs, Percy Spender, outlined the government's foreign policy last March, it had a striking basic continuity with the policy of Labourite Herbert Evatt. This was natural because both men had to meet the same irreducible facts, and the range of possible responses was severely limited. Spender's plan for Asia, essentially a campaign to strengthen the region economically and raise living standards, is quite in line with Evatt's Labourite thesis about the same area, but Spender had the boldness to translate it from thesis into a viable program. In the earliest stages of the planning it was recognized that co-operation and underwriting from the United States were essential, but Australia and the other Commonwealth countries have, with careful planning, been able to start implementing the program on their own.

In his foreign-policy statement last March Spender said: "... it is our objective to build up with the United States somewhat the same relationship as exists within the British Commonwealth. . . . That is to say, we desire a full exchange of information and experience of all important matters, and consultation on questions of mutual interest. Where we conceive our interests to diverge from those of the United States on any fundamental issue, we shall, of course, firmly maintain our own point of view. But, where our general objectives coincide, we shall seek to have done with petty disagreements and follow broad avenues of co-operation."

When these remarks are paired with those which, in effect, demoted the United Nations from its position of linchpin of Australian policy (to which Dr. Evatt had assigned it), you have a revolution in policy. The shift in emphasis from heavy reliance on the United Nations to close collaboration with the United States was based on two ideas which had wide currency in Australia: that the United Nations, while it must be warmly supported, cannot be Australia's principal reliance for security; and that in constantly reiterating in season and out that it was Australia's principal reliance, Dr. Evatt somehow irritated and alienated the United States. The events in Korea gave Australia a wonderful oppor-

tunity simultaneously to demonstrate its loyalty to the United Nations and its solidarity with the United States. If American opinion chose—as obviously it did in large measure choose—to regard Australia's help as help to the Americans, so much the better for Australia. Menzies's visit was made at the psychological moment for exploiting the effects of Australia's prompt action. He made full use of his opportunity.

What Menzies and Spender have succeeded in making clear is that Australia proposes to support the United States now and to follow also even if there is a third world war. Australia is in this thing to the bitter end. Labour supports this position. And just as Australia's close collaboration with the United States during the Second World War did not take it "out of the Empire," neither will this newest collaboration. But it will, no doubt, increase Australia's security in a possible third world war.

Australia is confronted with some exceedingly tough domestic problems. While overseas, Menzies talked with the United Kingdom and United States governments about defense, immigration, and finance. We are not apt to learn very soon what was said about defense at the London Cabinet meeting attended by the Chiefs of Staff, nor are we going to be told what was said to Menzies on this subject by President Truman and the Pentagon experts. But we do know that beginning next year Australia proposes to re-establish compulsory military training, last practiced in peacetime in 1929, and in four years expects the average annual number of trainees to reach twenty-one thousand. The expected cost will be 7,750,000 Australian pounds, or \$17,360,000, a year. This will create a trained reserve to back up a war organization of an army, navy, and air force, all much larger than their prewar counterparts. What might be called "current operating expenses" for defense (excluding war pensions, gratuities, rehabilitation allowances, etc.) were running at thirteen million pounds in 1939; in recent years they have been running around sixty million pounds; and they will now rise to around seventy million pounds, not counting expenditures for episodes such as that in Korea.

We also know that the Menzies Government is actively engaged in a campaign to outlaw the Communist Party and to drive all Communists from their positions in trade unions and the government service. This matter figures here because the law is based on the defense powers of the Constitution, and was rationalized by Menzies in terms of defense in his "second reading" speech. In the eyes of the Menzies Government the proposed Communist Party Dissolution Bill, 1950, is designed to smash an enemy fifth column.

The bill passed the House, but the Labour-dominated Senate amended the bill to pieces, concentrating on fortifying the legal rights of the accused. There was strong sentiment in the country favoring Labour's position. Menzies intends to reintroduce his bill when Parliament next meets, when events in Korea may have strengthened his hand.


All efforts to strengthen Australia's defenses will be of little avail if its economy is weak. At present the Australian economy is deranged by inflationary forces brought on by high prices for exports—especially wool—overconcentration on capital investment in developmental projects, government deficits in the states and the Commonwealth, and the concurrent failure of such industries as food processing, coal, steel, and building to expand their production sufficiently over prewar levels. In effect, as one exceedingly well-informed official put it, the economy is wrenched out of shape and desperately needs to be wrenched back again so that a sound, necessary expansion can take place with satisfactory results for all.

To do this requires working care-

fully through the existing industrial structure and bringing each segment into better balance with all the others. A suggested procedure would be to tackle food production first, and then proceed to transport, fuel and power, iron and steel, steel processing, and building, in roughly that order, breaking bottlenecks where they exist and raising productivity all along the line both by supplying more machine power—the average Australian has access to only about one-fourth as much horsepower as the average American—and by a campaign to make Australian labor favorably disposed to both mechanization and the managerial changes absolutely required.

The long-term developmental projects, which have captured the public's imagination, should be immediately reassessed, and those aspects of them which will contribute most to the short-term task outlined be chosen for quick completion. A dam to raise food-production levels in Victoria would, by this criterion, be more to the point than an effort to open up virgin territory somewhere else. The long-term plans can be picked up again and carried through to completion with less strain on the economy than they currently impose. They will then be less in the nature of heroic efforts than expressions of normal growth.

One reason for heroic efforts has been the immigration program, which has been accelerated until it involves an influx of two hundred thousand persons a year. It is hoped to hold to this figure each year for a decade at least. These people have thus far been largely absorbed into developmental projects, with some in building. Their employ-



ment, that is, has resulted in an increase in the demand for consumer goods with no corresponding increase in the supply of them. But the answer is obviously not to slow down migration. Australia needs, and surely can absorb, these people. It is a widely held opinion that Australia can support upwards of twenty million people at current living standards, as against its present population of eight million. At the moment the necessary move is to bring the economy up to maximum productive efficiency before it is completely overstrained by ambitious schemes for further development.

This does not mean a cessation of investment. It simply means that for a time investment should be made on a different scale of priorities. The Australian approach to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a loan is part of the campaign to overcome these difficulties. For a good while it has been contended that much of what Australia needs by way of equipment can be had only in the United States.

An added worry is whether, even with dollars, Australia can get precisely the items it needs when it needs them. Its officials suspect that the United States will soon have to establish priorities for exactly the things—earth-moving equipment, for instance—that Australia needs very much. A high place on the American priority list will be just as important as the loan.

What is Australia to America anyhow, other than a good friend in need in Korea? Should it, after all, be given a high position on the priority list if, as seems likely, rearmament forces our government to establish one?

Australia is still what the Second World War showed it to be, to the astonishment of all but a tiny handful of Americans: the only large and secure base available to the United States which is at all close to the continent of Asia.

If there is to be more trouble in Asia, and that seems practically certain, then Australia is the logical backstop and point of departure for many vital operations. And if we are looking not only for a base but also for a country with economic and defensive strength of its own in this area, then Australia fills the bill. —C. HARTLEY GRATTAN

## The Atom

# The Defense of Our Cities

After jolting the nation into hasty military preparations, the Korean outbreak has thrown our civic leaders into a mad scramble to do something about civil defense. For five years Federal officials have treated civil-defense plans as blackboard exercises. As Mayor Elmer E. Robinson of San Francisco put it: "Federal agencies have been shuffling papers, plans, and schemes back and forth between themselves. One report supersedes another. Neither is officially accepted as a guide for local authorities but both are sent to local authorities. That is a deplorable situation because you may plan the defense of your city one way, I may plan mine another, and someone else may have even a third plan. . . ."

The late James Forrestal, acting with a foresight and wisdom only now beginning to be appreciated, set up an Office of Civil Defense Planning in the Pentagon in the spring of 1948. By the end of that year the comprehensive Hopley Report, *Civil Defense for National Security*, was prepared for the Secretary of Defense and given wide distribution. But, like many other gov-

ernment reports, it was not acted upon; in fact, this report was never blessed by any other government agency. It fell into discard when the President plucked the civil-defense problem out of the hands of the military and gave it to the National Security Resources Board, where it was promptly pigeonholed. A year passed before W. Stuart Symington, the present chairman, moved over to NSRB from the Secretaryship of the Air Force, and a young atomic-weapons expert, Dr. Paul J. Larsen, was appointed Director of Civilian Mobilization.

Under Larsen's direction, planning began to move. On June 13, 1950, Larsen promised the assembled mayors on the West Coast: "... I want to assure you that the Federal government is developing a modern, flexible, and practical civil-defense program to meet all types of twentieth-century warfare. We have little doubt that the final results ... will be adequate to whatever situation an enemy might impose upon us." These words mollified the mayors, and they sat back to wait for September, when the NSRB plan would be unveiled.

Communist aggression in Korea overtook the timetable for the defense of our cities. Several cities and states plunged ahead on their own plans. Governor Thomas E. Dewey picked General Lucius D. Clay to head civil defense in New York State. In accepting the position, Clay remarked: "After a very calm and clear analysis of the facts we expect to develop a plan as soon as possible." These words keynote the fact that the nation starts from scratch in the summer of 1950 to prepare against wide-scale devastation.

As if to atone for its policy of not informing the American people, the Administration authorized the publication last month of a monumental treatise called *The Effects of Atomic Weapons*,



Wide World

Nagasaki: forwarding address



a 456-page book which examines in detail the various effects produced when a bomb is detonated in the air, on the surface of the ground, or below water or earth. The layman is confronted with an array of scientific terms, equations, and graphs. One Washington official summed it up as he laid the publication aside: "I wonder who it was written for?"

The British have published a homely little training booklet on atomic warfare which depends almost wholly upon an easy narrative augmented with simple diagrams, and can be read and understood by the man in the street. Such a publication is a major requirement on this side of the Atlantic.

Enough atomic bombs have now been detonated so that we can predict fairly accurately just what the effects will be if the bombs are set off above the surface of the earth. From a strictly military viewpoint, an air-burst atomic bomb does the most damage over the greatest area, and for this reason it is generally assumed that an enemy would employ this method of atomic attack against us. Obviously, the bigger the bomb, the wider the area affected. The 1945 Nagasaki-type atomic bomb was rated as being equivalent to twenty thousand tons of TNT. We may call this a small bomb. Assuming a big one as equivalent to fifty thousand tons of high explosive, and the probable future H-bomb as equal to two hundred thousand tons, we can make a comparison of the areas subject to moderate blast damage from the detonation in the air of a small atomic bomb, a big atomic bomb, and an H-bomb.

For planning purposes, what size bomb should we assume the Russians can produce? It seems reasonable to give them the benefit of the doubt and plan for a medium-sized bomb—something between a twenty- and fifty-thousand-ton high-explosive equivalent.

If we assume that the Soviet bomb is of the thirty-five-thousand-ton type and further assume that it is detonated half a mile above an American city, we can then proceed to predict the probable areas of damage from such a burst. The damage can be catalogued in three different categories.

The first, most spectacular effect of an atomic explosion is the *blast effect*.

It is in terms of blast effect that an atomic bomb is compared with conventional explosives. Experts classify blast damage in five degrees, ranging from demolition or virtually complete destruction to light damage. In between there are severe, moderate, and partial damage, the first classed as heavy structural damage (irreparable), the second heavy (but reparable), and the last self-explanatory.

When an atomic bomb is detonated, a relatively small amount of solid uranium is instantaneously converted into a glowing, intensely hot gas which quickly expands to form a fireball. Energy is radiated from this glowing mass in the form of visible, infrared, and ultraviolet rays as a prolonged flash of brilliant light. An ordinary TNT bomb produces temperatures of about five thousand degrees centigrade, but an atomic bomb boosts the temperature to the multimillion-degree level. Although this flash of heat can cause wood to ignite and causes conflagrations as widespread as many bomberloads of incendiaries, the most significant effect is on human beings.

In addition to blast effect and flash burn, there is *nuclear radiation*, which is emitted from an atomic explosion in a burst, half being produced in the first second after the explosion and the rest within ten seconds thereafter. A high air burst leaves no residue of radioactivity of any serious consequence, but bombs burst below earth or water may be expected to leave residual radiation (Bikini effect).

All three primary effects of the bomb—blast, heat, and nuclear radiation—occur simultaneously, and each has its own radius of action. Assuming that the enemy detonates a thirty-five-thousand-ton bomb half a mile over a city, if a person is within one mile of the ground zero he may be killed by any or all of the three effects. Beyond one mile, he is safe from penetrating radiation but can be killed by flash burn or by blast injury. Civil-defense planners can assess the casualties in their community by drawing a series of circles on population maps. While the results will vary with each city, the average figure for large American population centers



Wide World

*Japanese print: early atomic*

has been estimated by NSRB experts at 140,000 casualties. This figure includes the dead, missing, and injured. In an area such as that around Times Square the total casualties would be two to three times higher.

These estimates are based upon the assumption that the city receives no alert; they are, therefore, maximum figures. If a city receives a sufficient alert, if the people are disciplined to seek shelter, if shelters are available or the people seek good makeshift shelters, and if secondary damage from fires, cave-ins, and collapse is contained, then these casualty estimates can be halved. In the most favorable circumstances one can hope to reduce casualties to as little as a tenth, but this involves a tremendous amount of preparation for disaster. The alert is of the greatest importance to effective civil defense. If a man happened to be on the eightieth floor of the Empire State Building when an alert sounded, his chance of survival would be negligible unless he had a one-hour warning, for it would require at least that to evacuate the building.

Just what kind of alert time is it reasonable to expect? There is no firm answer to this question, for we do not know what means of delivering the bomb an enemy would use. If he employed the covert or clandestine technique, as it is technically termed in high government circles, then he could plant atomic bombs in our harbors, in tramp steamers, or in the basements of skyscrapers. Unless the bombs could be ferreted out in advance, the alert time would be zero. During the past summer the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were alerted more than once to the danger of a smuggled bomb.

Despite the publicity given to the tramp-steamer or Trojan-ship method of delivery, it is by no means an open-and-shut case that an enemy would elect to employ such a delivery scheme. The risk for him would be very great. Should a single bomb be detected, he would lose the all-important initiative. Furthermore, the mechanics of "exporting" bombs from a distance and the technical problems in preplacing and detonating them are by no means simple. Even the results obtained would argue against this method of delivery.

The means of delivery apparently



Wide World

### Hiroshima: barbershop

considered as the most probable by our defense experts is the heavy bomber. Today our \$85-million radar screen is still under construction, and even when it is completed it will not be holeproof, for radar has a horizon limitation that allows low-flying aircraft to escape detection. It is this well-known fact which, being misinterpreted by civil-defense officials, has led to the mushroom regrowth of an obsolete aircraft-spotting system. *Life* magazine recently featured a full-page photo of a grim-faced woman spotter gazing intently at the sky above San Francisco's bay area. The pathetic futility of the scene strikes home when one realizes that the bomb-release point for an atomic bomber would be ten or more miles from the city.

It is highly improbable that an enemy could stage a simultaneous attack upon our far-flung network of cities, or that such an attack, if attempted, would go undetected by all radar stations. Depending upon the nature of the alert, some cities should implement evacuation plans while others should have the populace routed to previously designated shelters. Here the man in the street will rightfully ask: "What constitutes an adequate shelter?" Perhaps the best answer is simply: "Any port in

a storm." It would hardly be feasible to provide adequate shelters for everyone, if by adequate we mean bunkers with five-foot concrete walls designed for all-night occupancy. British and German experience in the Second World War showed that far from perfect shelters can be highly effective against high explosives, and it is to be expected that we shall find this true for the atomic weapon. Of course, the one-mile circle directly around ground zero would have to be written off, for within it only the most ruggedly built shelters could be effective. It is highly unlikely that many such shelters will be—or in fact should be—constructed.

A lesson to be learned from the past war is that civilian discipline is just as important as shelters. Panic could be as disastrous as atomic explosion.

Thus the problem of civil defense is framed in terms of the probable damage from an atomic explosion, the maximum casualties, and the practicability of an alert. Clearly, it is an exceedingly tough problem; some will say it is one without a solution. Actually, there is a solution. The dispersion of our cities and industries would make targets which would be unprofitable for the enemy to bomb. However, this is viewed as political dynamite in Washington, and now that the



Wide World

Nagasaki: general view

Korean war has revised our time scale for preparedness, there is not sufficient time to undertake effective dispersion. While dispersion is the complete and eventual answer to weapons of mass destruction, there are partial answers that may prove useful. It is well to adopt the philosophy of a skilled boxer who knows that his opponent can knock him out with a series of lucky punches, but who nonetheless trains conscientiously, toughening his body to absorb punishment while perfecting his defense to ward off as many punches as possible. The analogy may be extended to point out that while the boxer has capable medical aid in his corner he does not rely upon it to win his fight. In this respect many of our defense planners, too much impressed with medical advice and in awe of radiation, have built their plans around medical relief for a bombed area. Medical aid for a stricken community is important, but it should not constitute the whole of civil defense.

The most reliable medical estimates of the casualties resulting from an air-burst atomic explosion over a large American city place the total toll at 140,000, of which half would be deaths. Not all the deaths would occur instantly, although it is estimated that about 45,000 would be killed outright,

or would die the first day. Another 15,000 or so would succumb during the first week and the remainder would die within six weeks. This means that apart from those missing or killed, there would be 95,000 casualties requiring medical treatment during the first week. Not all casualties would require extensive treatment and hospitalization, for many would suffer minor injuries from falling debris, superficial burns, and flying glass. About one-third of those injured would require hospitalization and careful treatment for radiation injury, serious flash burn, or internal injuries. Another third would require some hospitalization but not as much medical care and nursing; these people would in general come from the areas of intermediate blast damage. The remainder of the patients should not require hospitalization and could be treated at first-aid stations.

When these casualty estimates were given to an NSRB medical committee, the doctors were staggered. How could a city paralyzed by an atomic attack muster the medical facilities and personnel to cope with these tens of thousands of casualties? With hospitals demolished, many doctors killed or injured, medical supplies destroyed, and transportation at a standstill, how

could the injured be evacuated, hospitalized, and treated?

Plans must be made for establishing emergency hospitals, evacuating the wounded, enlisting medical aid from all nearby towns, setting up emergency reserves of medical supplies, and a whole host of allied measures. To the extent that we prepared in advance, we should be able to cope with an atomic disaster.

The very magnitude of the medical problem ought to compel civil-defense authorities to undertake every measure to minimize casualties. One of the most effective procedures would be to evacuate all women and children, along with nonessential workers, to smaller communities. This measure should remain in effect for the duration of the war. Those who had to remain in the target cities should be thoroughly disciplined for their role when disaster struck. They would have to be schooled in the rudiments of survival in an atomic bombing. A person caught in the open at some distance from a detonation can still survive (if beyond the lethal range of nuclear radiation) by shielding himself from the heat flash and the blast wave. At a distance of two miles from the blast it takes ten seconds for the concussion to be felt, and this may be sufficient time to seek some sort of shelter.

An atomic attack would obviously have a serious effect upon specific communities. But unless the attack were widespread, the resulting loss of population and industries would not knock out the United States. Especially if we were prepared, we could withstand terrific punishment. For the most part our industry is located on the peripheries of our cities and is not as vulnerable as the hearts of them are. But there is one prime target city that is of such importance to the nation that its loss would seriously cripple the country. This city is Washington. From the steps of the Capitol to the low silhouette of the mammoth Pentagon is only three miles as the crow flies. Yet within this three-mile circle are concentrated the National Military Establishment with its twenty-five thousand employees, the Navy Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and many offices of the Executive branch of



the government. All lie within the area which a single modern atomic bomb could devastate completely.

Within high government circles there has been angry debate about doing the obvious—moving the government agencies out of town. There are still many diehards in the capital who prefer to believe that “it can’t happen here,” and who vigorously resist any attempt to transplant the critical government agencies. Instead of moving out to Bethesda, Silver Spring, and Alexandria, the government is crowding more and more personnel into the District. Needled into action by the Korean war, Congress has authorized the establishment of an Office of Civil Defense for the District. However, the steps taken and the measures planned so far are wholly inconsistent with the size of the problem.

The confusion that exists in civil defense, with the local communities and the Federal government at loggerheads as to who should do what, reminds one of the classic story of two fire companies that rushed to put out a fire in a house. The house straddled the city line, and while the two fire companies argued over who should put out the fire, the house burned down. While the National Security Resources Board is charged with responsibility for civilian defense, it has no clearly defined authority and no operational function. The board has farmed out civilian defense to more than a score of government agencies, and it acts as a sort of holding company over them all. Now that cities are clamoring for civilian-defense preparedness and are specifying such measures as shelter construction, it is clear that staggering sums of money will soon be needed. True civilian defense will cost many billions of dollars, and if this money is to be spent sanely it must be cleared through a single operating agency, just as requests for appropriations from the Army, Navy, and Air Force are processed through the office of the Secretary of Defense. To handle the defense of our cities on a scale proportional to the magnitude of the problem, there must be established an Office of Civilian Defense with far greater authority than that now vested in the National Security Resources Board. Only in this way can this extremely tough problem be tackled realistically. —R. E. LAPP

## Women

# Matrons with a Mission

Once a year, in print dresses and flowered hats, the delegates of the General Federation of Women's Clubs descend upon some American city for their big convention. This year the city was Boston, where the modern Hotel Statler and ancient Mechanics Hall echoed to the high-pitched clamor always produced by a crowd of American women. Unlike some convention delegates, the General Federation ladies get up early and work hard. In Boston, they appeared at eight A.M., scrubbed, plump, and alert, their gray hair set in neat waves, for classes in parliamentary law or public speaking. Mornings, afternoons, and evenings, they listened to reports from officials and exhortations from prominent people, or they followed—as well as the dubious acoustics of Mechanics Hall allowed—the intricacies of voting on an amendment to an amendment to a resolution. But somehow they also found time to shop, ride the swanboats in the Public Gardens, go to Kings Chapel, and devour massive portions of roast beef, steak, corn bread, and Indian pudding in historic Boston restaurants. For the evening sessions they got dressed up, but not in the new short evening dresses, for they and their evening dresses trail serenely a few years behind the dictates of *Harper's Bazaar* and *Vogue*. The platform was securely banked with ma-



tronly figures in floor-length pastel crepes, each with a large lavender orchid planted on the left shoulder. When a runoff vote kept the delegates in Mechanics Hall till after midnight, one or two, standing in line to cast their ballots, complained that their feet hurt, but the rest were as unflaggingly talkative, interested, and determined as they had been sixteen hours before.

In its sixty years, the General Federation has marshaled this vitality behind a large number of causes and projects. Mrs. Jane Cunningham Croly, whom the official history calls the “mother” of the organization, was a pioneer newspaperwoman who wrote under the pen name of Jennie June. In 1868 she founded the first Sorosis Club in a fit of crusading pique after she and some women friends had been barred—because of their sex—from a testimonial dinner given in New York for Charles Dickens. By 1890 there were eighty-seven such clubs, and a federation was formed. Today that federation has over five million members in the United States and another five million overseas.

Over the years, the federation has attacked a long and diverse list of problems: education, adult education, public welfare, health, prison reform, narcotic control, Indians, veterans, and, in recent years, international relations. Its approach to such matters shuttles between the down-to-earth and the uplifting.

One morning at eight during this



last convention, Mrs. Hampton Fleming of Richmond, Virginia, explained parliamentary procedure to some hundred women as follows: "I want you to remember that you never go up the steps in parliamentary law that you don't have to come down again. You can't slide down the banisters." Mrs. Fleming is one of those slight, sweet-faced Southern ladies who all their lives are called "Miss Nellie," and whom one expects to be fluttery and ineffective. However, Mrs. Fleming seldom flutters. She has been the federation's parliamentarian for several years, and during moments of intense confusion at conventions, she stands at the president's elbow with Robert's *Rules of Order* in her hand and lays down the law. In class she is practical and occasionally reproving: "All you clubs make yo' quorums too big," she told her pupils one day. Asked from the floor how large a quorum should be for a club of 250 members, she answered, "How many do you think would be there on a rainy day with an epidemic in town? Nineteen? Well, make yo' quorum nineteen."

Mrs. Hiram C. Houghton, of Red Oak, Iowa, who was elected president of the federation for the next two years, represents the uplifting approach. A blonde, handsome, buxom woman, she has a big, typical American family, the members of which sat, gleaming with health and good looks, in the front row while she was inaugurated. Mrs. Houghton is given to breathless speeches and sweet smiles at somewhat meaningless intervals. In her inaugural address, she said that recently, standing "at the rim of the Grand Canyon in the beauty and vastness of that place, I longed with all my heart that Mr. Truman, Mr. Stalin, Mr. Acheson, and Mr. Molotov might stand there in their conferences and negotiations—for surely, beauty is next to divinity, and right and fair decisions

would be made and we would bring to reality the dream of One World." Mrs. Houghton also proposed to appoint a commission of twelve women, leaders of the federation, who would be on call if the United Nations, President Truman, or the State Department needed anything. "I have suggested the number twelve," said Mrs. Houghton, "because that number has a Biblical tradition. They would be apostles of peace, messengers of good will."

Recently Mrs. Houghton was chairman of the federation's successful "Build a Better Community Contest," in which three thousand local clubs participated, and out of which came a series of admirable local improvements. In Iuka, Mississippi, which won the grand prize, the women's club of nineteen members established an eye, ear, nose, and throat clinic; turned a garbage dump into a parking lot; raised money for a new Negro school, a new gymnasium and three new classrooms for the local high school; cleaned up the city park; organized community parties; and planted a row of dogwood trees on the highway leading into town. At the beginning of their project, the Iuka women met a certain amount of weary opposition from the local men. By the time the Iuka delegation's squeal of pleasure greeted the announcement at the convention that it had won, the contest had become as great a cause for excitement in Iuka as the City College basketball team was in New York last spring. Every night the head delegate telephoned to Iuka and the call was broadcast over a loudspeaker system from the local drugstore.

While the "Build a Better Community Contest" was the big thing at the Boston convention, the foreign members were not neglected, though each one was allowed only two minutes to speak her piece at the evening session devoted to the international clubs.

Mrs. Lina Tsaldaris, tragic and distinguished in black, asked the federation to take action in the cause of the Greek children abducted during the guerrilla warfare of 1948. A middle-aged Japanese explained her costume, a kimono in subdued shades of tan and black, "which is considered suitable for a woman of my age." Women of the Baltic countries, in peasant dresses to which they seemed rather unaccustomed, made garbled pleas in which they virtually asked armed American intervention in their homelands. All were heard placidly and sympathetically by the audience. But, in spite of their colorful costumes, their charming accents, and the seriousness of their problems, the foreigners seemed a little shadowy, weary, and tentative. It was Mrs. John L. Whitehurst, chairman of the Council of International Clubs, who held the stage.

"I can't tell you," said Mrs. Whitehurst, large, pink, and radiating good will in a bright-blue evening dress, "how proud I am when I look at these lovely, lovely representatives from countries all around the globe." Like a schoolteacher exhibiting her star pupils, she presented her representatives one by one and then sat back to listen with friendly attention. But she also kept a sharp eye on them; if one of them threatened to go over her time, Mrs. Whitehurst advanced with the schoolteacher's kindly but impersonal authority and drew her away from the microphone. Under Mrs. Whitehurst's chairmanship, membership in the international clubs has expanded enormously; over fifty-seven thousand packages were sent overseas by federation



members; over twenty-three thousand members corresponded with foreign women; exchange of students and teachers was promoted. Sending packages and writing letters are not world-shaking acts, but Mrs. Whitehurst seemed to have a perfectly clear idea of their value. "If we do these things," she told the convention, "we will be able to present our real way of life, rather than be shadowed by the Soviet propaganda which portrays us as a greedy, imperialistic nation."

One of the federation's most important purposes is to see that American women know what they are talking about. Mrs. J. L. Blair Buck, the last president, has said that federation policy is "probably much more progressive than women's private opinions would be if there were no federation to keep them informed."

With this emphasis, it behooves the federation officials to be particularly well informed themselves, and most of them are. If you stopped one of them in the draughty reaches of Mechanics Hall to ask about some project she was interested in, she could, and would, at the drop of a hat, quote population figures, budgets, statistics. Federation officials agree that being an officer is an education in itself, even though the schooling often begins just about the time the first child starts off to college.

One valuable part of this education takes place on Capitol Hill. At the federation's headquarters in Washington, two of its officers, the president and the Chairman of the Legislation Department, are officially registered as lobbyists. They receive no pay, which, they feel, tends to make Congressmen trust their motives.

The federation's legislation program includes statehood for Alaska, Federal aid to education, reform of the electoral college, passage of the women's-equal-rights amendment, and representation for the District of Columbia. A vote at the convention gives the leaders a mandate on questions such as these, and it is only occasionally that a local club publicly declares its disagreement, though the federation by-laws permit it to do so.

At the recent convention, Mrs. Clarence D. Wright, chairman of the Legislation Department, a hearty and cheerful Washington lawyer who got into the federation through a local garden club, discovered that a Kentucky



Senator had decided to table the bill for representation for the District of Columbia. The Senator's reason was that sentiment in the states should have an opportunity to express itself. Sputtering with rage, Mrs. Wright at once began to roam Mechanics Hall talking to reporters and exhorting the Kentucky delegation to get the Senator on the telephone.

Federation officials and members take credit—or part of the credit, depending on how cautious the speaker is—for arousing U.S. public opinion in favor of the European Recovery Program. It is certainly true that their five million members were in favor of it. In the past, they, or they with other women's groups, have been given specific credit for a number of national improvements. The American Library Association credits women's clubs with establishing eighty-five per cent of the libraries in the United States. The federation claims it played a major part in establishing the Children's Bureau and the Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor. Dr. Harvey W. Wiley, author of the Pure Food and Drugs Act, whose widow has been an official of the federation for many years, credited the federation with passage of the bill.

The women of the General Federation do not seem to have heard of the current intellectual point of view which

deplores the aggressiveness of the woman who competes in men's activities. I doubt if many members have read *Modern Woman: The Lost Sex*. They would probably be profoundly shocked if they did. Some of the older members of the federation were in the thick of the campaign for woman suffrage. Today they seem to feel that they earned the right to be militant long ago and have gone on to other things. "After all," said a placid elderly woman, slightly surprised that I should question her about such an out-of-date subject as woman's place, "a lot of us are grandmothers. We've brought up our children. I don't see how anyone can say we haven't done our duty as women."

"What they don't realize," boomed Mrs. William Dick Sporborg, who represents the federation at the U. N., "when they talk about sending us back to the home is that we have never left the home."

Far from apologizing for it, some clubwomen take their militancy for granted and with a certain good humor. One member of a large city club described her appearance before the local city council to press an improvement program: "First a dear little old lady talked, but she had a soft voice and she was little—you should never have someone who's too short speak for



you. All the men were smoking and nobody was listening, so I got up and said, 'I'm wearing this coat [bright magenta] so you can see me, and I'm talking out loud so you can hear.' Well, they listened. My husband was there and he said, 'I was very embarrassed.' The clubwoman giggled happily. "They said to him, 'My gosh, is your wife a teacher?' He said, 'No, but she's an ex-Campfire Girl leader.'"

Asked how clubwomen, very few of whom have servants, find time for their activities, she answered: "Well, women schedule their time better now, and there are all the new gadgets and frozen foods . . ."

Behind reactions like these is a resolute and undaunted confidence which seems to be something more than the natural confidence of a housewife that something messy can be cleaned up with a little elbow grease. The women of the federation have a strong, unquestioning certainty about right and wrong, even in complex political questions. "Food surpluses are an immoral thing," said a speaker. "I don't pretend to know what the answer is but I know they're immoral."

Discussing reform of the Electoral College, a speaker pointed out that it would decrease the power of states such as New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. But, she said, "I think the women of those states are big enough and fine enough to want to help the women of the other states." The moral confidence of the federation does not seem necessarily to be based on religion or formal ethics; it is founded on good will and an assumption of good will and generosity in others.

There is little atmosphere of doubt at a federation convention, of tasks too big to cope with, or any sense that the world is so impenetrably complex and mysterious that it would take at least a lifetime to understand it. An atmosphere of doubt may be favorable for artistic creation, for spiritual understanding, or merely for interesting conversation, but it is not the best atmosphere for co-operative activity, and that is what the federation is interested in. Life in America might be more restful if the women of the federation took a less sunny and vigorous point of view, but who, in that case, would plant dogwood trees on the road to Iuka?

—SYLVIA WRIGHT

## Views & Reviews

# Stalin Talks At Last

Muscovites must have rubbed their eyes in amazement a few days before the war in Korea, when, amid all the mounting international tension, Stalin treated them to a very long and involved essay on the theory of linguistics. The essay took up several pages of *Pravda* and other Soviet newspapers. It was accepted as a revelation, as any statement by Stalin is bound to be; and it became the subject of endless comment. For a number of days linguistics overshadowed politics and strategy. The fighting in Korea seemed insignificant compared with whether language belongs to the "structure" or the "superstructure" of society, and what are the merits and demerits of comparative philology and of the theories of the late professor N. Y. Marr, until recently the leading light in Soviet linguistics.

Stalin soon followed up his essay with a series of his letters on the same subject. Later, while the western public was anxiously watching Mr. Malik's return to the Security Council, the Soviet public was again startled by the spectacle of their Prime Minister throwing up the skull of Professor Marr. In a new series of letters the superlinguist of the Kremlin argued about dialect, slang, and language, about the prospects of a socialist world language, and about the thought processes of deaf-mutes. (Since words are the "garment-flesh" of thought, can deaf-mutes, who know no words, do any real thinking?)

"What is he driving at?" the readers of *Pravda* must have wondered. Since the end of the war Stalin had been even less communicative than usual. For more than four years (and what years!) he had not once addressed the Soviet people. For more than eleven years he had not spoken at any party convention; none had been convened. Only now and then, when he allowed a foreigner to interview him for publi-

cation, did the Soviet public, by a roundabout way, get the benefit of his views. Stalin has kept aloof from the intense ideological campaigning to which the Soviet intelligentsia has been subjected in recent years. He has not participated in the famous controversy over Lysenko's biological theory, although this has had practical implications for agricultural policy, nor in any of the literary "debates," nor in the denunciation of "decadent cosmopolitans." Why, then, has the Sphinx now broken silence, and why has he chosen to speak on linguistics, of all subjects?

The only languages Stalin knows are his native Georgian and Russian, and his command of Russian has remained rather imperfect till this day. "I am not a philologist," he himself says. But then he goes on confidently to destroy and ridicule a philological theory which, rightly or wrongly, had been recognized as the last word of Soviet science for over a quarter of a century. "Marxism in linguistics, as in other social sciences, is something directly in my field," he explains. In the same fashion, medieval theologians sat in judgment over astronomers and astronomical systems, even though they were not themselves astronomers; it was enough that they were inspired by the Holy Spirit.

Stalin's argument against Marr's disciples seems calculated to give the Soviet intelligentsia a vague impression that he, Stalin, has opposed the monolithic orthodoxy enforced in Soviet literature and science by Zhdanov, that he may favor loosening the harsh ideological discipline imposed upon academicians and writers by his late lieutenant. For what he attacks now is not just the theories of the "Marr school" but above all the monopoly of that school in Soviet linguistics.

"In linguistic bodies a régime has prevailed," says Stalin, "which is alien to science and men of science. The

slightest criticism of the state of affairs in Soviet linguistics, even the most timid attempt to criticize the so-called new doctrine . . . was persecuted and suppressed . . . Valuable research workers were dismissed from their posts or demoted for being critical of N. Y. Marr's heritage or: for expressing the slightest disapproval of his teachings. Linguists were appointed to academic posts not for their merits but because of their unqualified acceptance of Marr's theories."

"It is generally recognized," Stalin concluded, "that no science can develop and flourish without the clash of views, without the freedom of criticism." This truth had been "flouted" by a "closely knit group of infallible leaders." The climate of intellectual oppression which was created reminded Stalin of the régime of Alexei Arakcheyev, the "evil genius" of Tsar Alexander I, the harsh disciplinarian and ruthless organizer of military colonies, whose methods eventually provoked the famous Decembrist revolt of 1825.

Stalin's description of this "state of affairs in linguistics" may of course be applied to every other field of Soviet



intellectual activity. Has not the "slightest criticism" of Lysenko been "persecuted and suppressed"? Have "valuable research workers" not been dismissed or demoted for criticizing the new doctrine in biology? Has any "clash of views" been allowed in the social sciences, literature, or the arts? Such questions must occur to many a Soviet intellectual, who in his mind may easily substitute Zhdanov for Arakcheyev.

Is a liberalization of the intellectual life in the offing? And if so, will Marr's disciples dare defend themselves against Stalin's attack? "The freedom of criticism" can hardly be carried as far as that. Nevertheless, Stalin has used the linguistic controversy, not without some adroitness, to make something like a conciliatory approach to the intelligentsia. He has gone so far as to say that even in Marr's erroneous theories there are elements worth studying, thereby giving an example of rare discrimination and "open-mindedness" in a country where things are usually either denounced or praised wholesale.

In his characteristic ambiguous manner, Stalin takes a position as arbiter between the party experts on orthodoxy and the intelligentsia. Quite deliberately he fosters the belief that he, Stalin, is more liberal than his entourage, a belief very similar to the old-time Russian maxim that "the Tsar is good; only his advisers are bad."

This strange overture, this half gesture of conciliation, is undoubtedly dictated by a major political consideration. The Politburo cannot afford to face the dangers of international conflict with an intimidated and resentful intelligentsia at its back; and the Zhdanov régime must have generated a lot of intimidation and resentment. Stalin is shrewd enough to realize this and to try betimes to plaster over cracks on his home front. At the same time it is characteristic of his mentality, and the rigidity of his system, that even to hint at a measure of domestic appeasement, he has had to single out some group for an attack. "The practice of politics in the East," Disraeli once said, "may be defined by one word—dissimulation."

In the context of this bizarre controversy, in an almost casual aside, Stalin has also raised another political issue—the "withering away of the state." Marxists believe that a socialist society, free from class antagonisms and inequality, should need no political or social coercion. The state, the instrument of that coercion, should gradually "wither away," and only the noncoercive functions of government survive. This, if you like, is the Marxist modification of the old liberal maxim: "The less government, the better." It follows that whenever the seemingly abstract problem of the withering away of the state holds Russian attention, a highly practical issue—the amount of govern-




mental coercion to be applied at home —is at stake.

Throughout the 1930's Stalin had to justify the building up of an oppressive totalitarian state in Marxist terms—that is, in terms of a theory which insisted that a socialist régime, once it has been consolidated, should need less political coercion than in any capitalist democracy. Stalin then declared that this theory, correct in general, could not apply to an isolated socialist state. Communist Russia, confronted by the hostility of the entire capitalist world, must have more government, more armed forces, more police, more prisons. The dramatic transformation of Bolshevism from a libertarian into a totalitarian party was epitomized in Stalin's uncompromising rejection of the withering away of the state, a rejection justified by constant reference to Russia's isolation.

Since the last war, and especially since the victory of the Chinese Communists, this reference to isolation has become outdated. More than five hundred million people have joined the Soviet bloc. The old Stalinist argument has proved double-edged. Those who have taken it at its face value may wonder whether this is not the time for the state to be gradually deflated, if not to wither away—whether, in other words, there shouldn't be less governmental coercion now and more domestic freedom. This is the challenge with which, sincerely or not, Tito is now confronting Stalin when he proclaims

the relaxation of totalitarian controls in Yugoslavia. Between the lines of Mao's speeches, too, one may detect somewhat more enthusiasm for the withering away of the state than there is in the Kremlin, even though Mao may faithfully repeat most of Stalin's formulas. Last but not least, the obsolescence of theories and dogmas derived from the period of "socialism in one country" could not have passed altogether unnoticed inside Russia as well. Some reaction from those theories and dogmas is likely to be developing slowly in the mind of the young Soviet intelligentsia.

It is with an eye to such embarrassing ideological undercurrents that Stalin has now briefly restated his attitude. For the first time he has acknowledged, but only by implication, that the period of "socialism in one country" is over. He now speaks about "socialism in several





countries," but he does so only to prove that the more things have changed, the more they are the same. The state cannot yet begin to wither away—not until socialism has won in *most* countries. And only when a classless society has been established not just in most countries but all over the earth can a world language, which will be "neither French, nor English, nor Russian," replace the existing national languages. In the meantime, however, long live the powerful, coercive machinery of dictatorship!

Coming from Stalin, this can hardly be considered a startling conclusion, but it is significant that he should have stated it just now. Since this has so far been his only public reply to President Truman's challenge, the Soviet people will search Stalin's Delphic words for a clue to the moves he may contemplate. Those who are not concerned with linguistics will scrutinize in the first instance the new distinction he has drawn between socialism "in one country," "in several countries," "in most countries," and "all over the world." They will reflect over the duration of the intervals between the various stages which the Leader may have in mind. It is quite a few years since Stalin has last spoken about world revolution, and his taking up of this theme just now may not be devoid of some significance. This may be his implied counterthreat to those who, he thinks, threaten Russia with war.

On the other hand, he has taken up that theme in so casual and academic a manner, in a context so remote from all the great issues of the day, that what he has said commits him to nothing. The context of his argument suggests, on the contrary, that in his view "socialism in several countries" (but not yet in most) will, like socialism in one country, extend over a whole historical period. During that period, the duration of which cannot be foreseen, most of the world is likely to remain under capitalist domination. This is why no significant liberalization of domestic policy can be expected, despite Stalin's own pleadings for freedom of expression for the intelligentsia. The margin of that freedom must remain narrow as long as "socialism," though no longer isolated in a single country, is confined to one-third of the world.


—ISAAC DEUTSCHER

Press

## The Milwaukee Journal

Lucius W. Nieman, founder of the *Milwaukee Journal*, gave that paper an early reputation for judicial impartiality, unflinching courage, and a lively interest in world affairs. Harry J. Grant, who came to the paper in 1916 as business manager and today is chairman of the board, added to the original ingredients more complete wire-service and syndicate coverage, a better (because better-paid) local staff, and increased attention to city, state, and regional news. The richer mixture was paying off in wider readership, increased profits, and enhanced respect when, in 1935, a specter suddenly appeared that threatened the whole structure.

It was a specter that had rapped insistently on the front-office doors of many U. S. newspapers. The *Journal*,



founded by one idealist and brought to full flower by another, was about to be sold to a person or persons unknown, not necessarily idealists. Veteran editors, reporters, and desk men, several of whom remembered only too vividly how the *Chicago Inter-Ocean*, the *Chicago Record-Herald*, or the *Milwaukee Sentinel* had been sold out from under them, began nervously to eye the nearest exits.

On October 1, the for-some-time-incapacitated founder of Wisconsin's biggest and best paper had died at the age of seventy-eight, leaving as his only heirs his widow and a school-teacher niece. Within a matter of weeks the widow, Agnes Wahl Nieman, joined her husband, willing the proceeds of her *Journal* stock to Harvard University, which was to use the sum to establish the Nieman Foundation "to promote and elevate the standards of journalism in the United States."

Lute Nieman's will had provided that his heirs' shares of the capital stock itself—a fifty-five per cent controlling interest—be sold, presumably to the highest bidder, within five years of his wife's death. No one knew how much they might fetch, but going revenue figures rated these 1,100 shares at around \$4,500 a share. And the dumbest copy boy could tick off the names of those "investment publishers" who might have \$5 million to plunk into a profitable absentee property: William Randolph Hearst (who had already scavenged the *Sentinel*); Roy W. Howard of the far-flung Scripps-Howard chain; Moe Annenberg of the Philadelphia *Inquirer* and the race-news business; Frank E. Gannett of Rochester, New York, and later of the Committee for Constitutional Government; and possibly Paul Block of Toledo, Newark, and Pittsburgh.

"I'll take Howard," a veteran *Journal* editorial writer announced at one of the nightly wakes in the cafeteria. "At least Scripps-Howard has a tradition."

"You will take," croaked a companion, "precisely what the court hands you."

And everyone nodded solemnly, remembering the painfully recent fates of the men and women of the New York *World* and *Evening World* and the Kansas City *Journal-Post*.

It was a bitter prospect for a staff



which even then was one of the most loyal in newspaper annals; and what made it all the more bitter was that a combination of factors had contrived to prolong the period of illusory security. "Journal luck," they had called it. In the first place, as Nieman was to leave no ambitious sons, sons-in-law, grandsons, or nephews—and no tradition-proud widow or daughter to force an unambitious successor into journalism—the staff had never had to look forward to dreary years of watching the law of diminishing returns in operation. In the second, Harry Grant had run the paper for so long it had come to be taken for granted that he practically owned it. The hardest thing the staff had to swallow was the realization that "The Boss," with only his original twenty per cent stock holdings, was now merely one of nine-hundred-odd faithful *Journal* employees about to be tossed on the junk heap.

Fortunately for them all, the ruddy-cheeked, bulldog-jawed gentleman of fifty-four whose eclipse they feared had other plans. For some time Grant had been asking himself what would happen when Lute Nieman died. Mrs. Nieman loved the paper; but she loved her husband more and, womanlike, might think some foundation bearing his name a more fitting tribute to his memory than a newspaper which already had ceased to bear his personal stamp. Miss Faye McBeath, the niece who would receive 27.5 per cent of the stock the day her aunt died, presumably loved the paper too; but she was shy and self-effacing, and no one knew what she would do with her large inheritance. The family of Lloyd Tilghman Boyd, the *Journal's* first

business manager, which held a twenty-five per cent interest, was loyal, but not necessarily to the point of turning down a generous outside offer. Any two of these stockholders could deliver the property.

For some time Grant had been mulling over the idea of trying to get the Niemans to make some of their stock available to employees. Once or twice he had dropped a broad hint, but Nieman had at first been cool to the notion, and later was incapable of grappling with such basic decisions. His death was Grant's signal to move. Mrs. Nieman had already written Harvard into her will. Stunned by her loss, she could think only of this monument to her departed husband. In the midst of inconclusive negotiations, she died.

A stockholder at last, Miss McBeath welcomed Grant's scheme, agreeing to take her share of the inheritance in stock rather than cash. Elwyn Evans, representing the Boyd estate, said he would go along, provided Harvard would consent to a reasonable price. In March, 1936, the Journal Company and Miss McBeath (technically not yet a partner) offered the trustees of the Lucius Nieman will \$3,500 a share. It was not the high bid: Annenberg had offered \$4,250, and it was believed Hearst and Howard would match that. President Conant and the Fellows of the Harvard Corporation consented to the lower figure, thereby demonstrating that Mrs. Nieman had left her money to the right institution. Final decision rested with the Milwaukee County Court. Grant put his finger firmly on a clause in Nieman's will stipulating that the stock be sold to those "able to carry out the ideals and principles" he (and Grant) had estab-

lished. The court agreed with the trustees that Grant's proposal offered the greatest assurance of this. There remained one hurdle—an unexpected one: Distant relatives of Mrs. Nieman brought suit to break her will. The Wisconsin Supreme Court threw their claims out in December, 1936.

The following May, the articles of incorporation were amended to increase the number of shares from two thousand to two hundred thousand, thus reducing the par value from one hundred dollars to one dollar a share. Eighty thousand shares were set aside as treasury stock (since retired), leaving Grant, Miss McBeath, and the Boyds with forty thousand shares apiece. Each promptly relinquished ten thousand to make thirty thousand available to employees at thirty-five dollars a share—the price paid to the Nieman estate. To make certain that employees would be able to take advantage of the opportunity, the three principals authorized a company bonus of \$250,300, equal to roughly half the fifty per cent down payment required by the SEC, and also set up the Journal Shares Corporation, which loaned the balance at three per cent interest. As it turned out, semiannual dividends left the buyers very little to borrow.

Of 602 eligible employees, 558 jumped at what Grant has described as a "winning-team" formula. In 1938 Grant and Miss McBeath made an additional eighteen thousand shares available, and in 1948 put the final eighteen thousand up, thus giving the staff its present fifty-five per cent majority.

Currently, allocation of stock is at the discretion of John Donald Ferguson, president of the Journal Company and editor of the *Journal*. In practice, allocation is virtually automatic. All stockholders must liquidate their holdings, to other employees and through the company machinery, upon leaving the *Journal*, or upon reaching sixty-five. As shares become available, three-year employees next in rotation may be offered units numbering one to three times the dollar amount of their weekly salaries.

When negotiations for the plan were at their height, the American Newspaper Guild sent an organizer around, and almost tipped the applecart. Grant

would have none of the Guild. And because he is unwilling to have his own security device constantly thrown off balance by the frequent fluctuations in the dollar value of union-bargained security clauses, the *Journal's* mechanical units' members are limited to the equivalent of forty-five original shares each.

In May, 1943, Grant asked the employee-stockholders to create a Unit-holders Council of twenty-four members to "advise with the Board, to be at all times representative of the unit-holders' group, and to be articulate in the unit-holders' interest." Six council members serve on the company's twenty-two-man board of directors. Grant makes no bones of the fact that the Unitholders Council is advisory, not executive; it can and does make suggestions, and they are more often followed than not, but in the last analysis Grant and his principal executive aides set policy. In this respect, the rank-and-file employees differ from those on other papers in that the latter are not usually invited to make suggestions. Actually, as long as Grant is at the helm, the distinction between advisory and executive power is academic: His editorial policy has been an open book for so long it may be assumed that anyone who has worked for him long enough to become a stockholder agrees with it, in the main at least.

Today 727 employees have an equity in their paper worth more than \$6 million, and have received nearly \$5 million in dividends. But that does not tell the whole story. The *Journal* consistently pays better than the scale for newspapers with comparable circulation in cities of comparable size. Moreover, the company has a non-contributory pension plan available to all, union and nonunion, paying a maximum of \$7,500 a year. It defrays half the cost of group life insurance, and the full cost of hospital and surgical coverage; and has a generous policy on such things as sick and maternity leave, vacations with pay, sabbaticals, and severance pay.

The question inevitably arises: Is the *Journal* good because of, in spite of, or quite independently of the stock-sharing plan? The question has something of the essential unreality of so many questions posed by a certain type of



social scientist who likes to believe that he can isolate rare social viruses and antibodies under the punch-card microscope. There is ample evidence that the plan contributes materially to the maintenance of a high professional level set long before it came into existence. It certainly averted the sort of catastrophe that sooner or later overtakes most "good" newspapers. It offers the employees not only a larger measure of immediate material security than almost any other newspaper staff enjoys, but also a type of security that no union can vouchsafe to its members; that no individual employer, however sincere and well-intentioned, can guarantee beyond his own life span—indeed, the only meaningful security for those who look upon their work as a profession rather than a craft: the specific assurance that it can never be sold out from under them. The two types of security combined naturally attract newspaper folk from all over the country, thus maintaining and heightening earlier standards.

Newspaper people I saw in Detroit, Chicago, Minneapolis, St. Paul, Omaha, and Lincoln were unanimous in the verdict that the Milwaukee *Journal* is a good paper. A Chicago managing editor thought it might be the best in the country. Even the hypercritical remnants of LaFollette Progressivism in Madison allowed that the *Journal* was "exemplary." It was only in Madison that I heard questions: Wasn't it a fact that Grant was the real boss, that staff participation was merely an illusion? Hadn't the *Journal* employees paid too high a price in giving up the Guild? Weren't the mechanical work-

ers being penalized, actually, for belonging to a union? Weren't the "little fellows" lost in the shuffle? Wasn't so much "paternalism" on the face of it a bad thing? And wasn't it probably the case that some *Journal* employees were always seething underneath about *Journal* policy?

The sensible thing seemed to be to put such questions to members of the *Journal* staff. I did so. The first staffer I found happened to be a pro-labor labor writer, so I asked him about the Guild.

"Look," he said wearily, "nobody's given any hostages to anything. A guy says it isn't in the best interests of Milwaukee to let New York or Philadelphia capital come in here," and maybe subordinate community interests to—well, let's say broader interests—and everybody applauds. But when the same guy balks at letting in a national union on the same grounds, some people yell bloody murder. No one denies that the Guild is needed, because so many publishers are sons of bitches. Ours happens not to be. Moreover, our package includes a standing invitation to make this a better paper—an employee function which the Guild long ago abdicated. No, friend, I'll take Harry's deal."

What about the "discrimination" against printers?

"How would you have it?" the labor man asked. "If you gave them a numerically equal shot at Harry's security, they'd wind up with more over-all security, because they've got a lot that's nailed down by union contract. That's a little problem the social-security



boys in Washington are still wrestling with. But come on down to the composing room and have a look at the unhappy slaves."

We reached the banks of display advertising type just in time to witness a minor tragedy. A stoneman dropped a four-column hand-set job on the floor.

"Hey, you!" three voices chorused. "Stop piein' our profits!"

Wandering back to the news room, I asked a copyreader if he felt the strait jacket of paternalism.

"Funny thing," he mused. "If you want government to provide security, you're a liberal. But if a private enterpriser meets government's charge that he won't do anything by coming up with a scheme of his own, why, he's a—you name it."

Still, there was a chance that the little fellow got lost in the shuffle somehow.

"I don't want to bore you," the librarian said, "but if you're looking for staff comments I'd just like to say that I've been in this business thirty years—UP, AP, and half a dozen papers—and I never was treated like a human being until I came here. It isn't just that the pay is better. Or being able to own stock. But when Fergy comes around and tells me how important my little routing system is to everybody . . ."

Routing system? What was that?

"Well, you see, knowing that Fergy and the editorial writers and all the others don't have time to wade through all the stuff that's printed, I try to go through the magazines and mark certain articles, or even just paragraphs, and then pass them around. And I try to cover book reviews the same way, even the books themselves as much as I can. They all say it helps. But what pleases me is that they take the trouble to tell me."

I had saved two or three questions for Lindsay Hoben, the chief editorial writer, who had asked me to supper.

"Ask me anything," Hoben said. "I joined the paper twenty-six years ago as church reporter. Been chief editorial writer just over a year. Not much turnover, you know. Fergy was the last editorial writer hired from outside in twenty-seven years, until I lured Perry Hill away from the *Sentinel* just the other day."

We drove north along the Memorial Highway that skirts Lake Michigan. I was thinking that Milwaukee wouldn't be a bad place to live.

"Old mansions begin here," Hoben explained. "Newer houses farther out. Almost everybody lives within easy walking distance of the lake; it's our municipal bathtub."

"What about this business of Ferguson's allocating stock, and Grant able to fire Ferguson, so that . . ."

My host grinned broadly.

"You've read the *Saturday Evening Post* piece, I see. (He himself had given it to me to read.) Seems like a lot of trouble for Harry to have gone to to get control, since he could have bought the Nieman stock himself back there in 1937."

"How do you decide which Presidential candidate to back?" I persisted.

"That a sequitur? Yes, I suppose it is. Why, we talk it over. In 1944 Dewey got a nod, but by so slight a margin that the editorial backing he got from us was pretty lukewarm. In 1948 we were a little warmer. But by that time I think a majority of the staff felt the same way." He gave me a bland look. "Would you say positively that we were wrong?"

I would not say that the *Journal*—that any paper—had never been wrong; but I would say that these people have always tried their damndest to be honest. All over Illinois, Wisconsin,



Minnesota, and Nebraska in June and July I was told that the anti-Fair Dealers out there were going to use the Korean mess as a "logical extension" of McCarthyism. Some of the papers and most of the Republican candidates had already begun this curious transition.

So I felt gratified when, running through some recent issues of the *Journal* after my return to New York, my

eye fell on the column-long lead editorial for July 26, entitled "A TIME TO FORGET POLITICS"—and as it is one of the best editorials I have ever read, I think some excerpts properly belong here:

"Stalin's instructions to Communists in the United States . . . are to confuse and divide the American people. . . . This is a job that the decimated American Communists have not succeeded in doing; but it is being done for them—by politicians who put party before country. . . . At a time when united, decisive action must be taken to protect the nation, the senate is deep in the mire of politics, its members jawing at each other like fishwives. . . ."

"Both political parties are busy slinging mud. . . . Intemperance has bred intemperance. McCarthy's charges were intemperate, the Democratic report was intemperate, the Republicans' answers are intemperate. . . ."

"Even a more dangerous course is being pursued by the Republican national committee and some Republican senators in branding the Korean war 'Mr. Truman's war.' The national committee clip-sheet for July 17 does this. John Tope, chairman of the Young Republican National federation, did it at Des Moines recently."

"This is a shameful thing. . . . If Mr. Truman loses 'his war' in South Korea this country will be so discredited that the big showdown we are hoping to avoid by drawing a line on aggression will come when Russia chooses to start it."

"The GOP Editorial Digest of July 24 blames the failure of the Korean aid act of last January to include military aid for South Korea's weakness in the face of attack. . . . On Jan. 19 the House killed the Korean economic aid bill by a 193 to 191 vote—with 131 Republicans voting against it and only 21 for it. . . ."

"Senator Taft aids confusion and division. . . . He blames the war in Korea on the failure to support the collapsing Nationalist regime in China. The man who fears European entanglements apparently sees no entanglement in his claim that we should have used force in China a year ago. Will Senator Taft, who aspires to be president, tell the American people frankly whether he would have fought

the Chinese Communists last year had he been President?"

I put the editorial aside, and my mind went back to a conversation I had had in the *Journal* cafeteria. My companions were a sharp-eyed young political writer who had just finished his Nieman Fellowship year at Harvard, and the *Journal's* drama and music critic.

"This paper isn't nearly good enough," the young man grumbled. "It has slipped."

"That," the veteran gently reminded him, "would be a matter of perspective. I have not been aware of any backsliding. But do we still agree on the bench mark, you and I? We have said that we believe in the preservation of the American dream—which is a way of saying that we believe in the preservation of western civilization, I suppose. That can mean seeing to it that a bewildered Chinese laundryman gets justice in the courts of this city. It can also mean spilling blood on some distant battlefield. Sometimes I think the cub police reporter—even the soldier—has an easier time than an editor. I don't envy our editor."

The young man said yes, he guessed that was about it. Then he excused himself for an assignment. When he had gone the veteran touched my arm.

"Bob has been away on Olympus," he explained. "He has spent nine months under the hot-and-cold shower of scholarly self-examination, and his hide is a little tender. It's healthy to have our young men going off periodically to Cambridge or Cambodia, and coming back here yowling like scalded cats over the wickedness in the world. It keeps us from falling asleep."

One is left with the feeling, after an intensive ninety-day examination of this extraordinary newspaper, that the daily critical evaluation of each other's work by a staff imbued with a sense of historic continuity is pretty nearly indispensable to the making of a great mass medium of information. Why do not more newspaper staffs have these attributes? I am persuaded that it is because the others lack the assurance that ability, not family, will be recognized, buttressed by the comforting knowledge that the future rests on nothing less secure than the survival of America itself. —LLEWELLYN WHITE

## To Man's Measure . . .

### *Soldier off to War*

The French ship *Liberté* came up the bay on her maiden voyage to New York, and, saluting her, the fireboats nozzled water up into the air and it fell in spray; the ships in the harbor saluted with their whistles; the *Liberté* responded with three deep-throated blasts. Along the waterfront it sounded a little the way it does when the city greets the New Year, at midnight, when factories and ships blow their whistles all together and the sounds modulate, forming and dissolving chords—it was Liszt or Chopin or someone who liked to play on a piano that was out of tune, forming and dissolving unpredictable harmonies. The day the *Liberté* reached New York her photograph—the two squat funnels, the rounded bridge, the terraced stern—displaced the Korean war photographs from page one.

Next day they were there again—the barren hills, the rice paddies, the advance patrol entering the village, the tank with the infantrymen beside it taking cover, the machine-gun emplacement on the hill with the machine gunner standing guard. But it does not really matter whether the Korean pictures are on the front page or not, because nothing can change the fact that the American soldier in Korea is far away across the seas, distant from us, separated from us, and alone.

The soldier's farewell is the most final of all farewells. It is absolutely purposeless to be maudlin about it. The soldier goes where his country cannot follow.

There is a great deal of pretense to the contrary, and much exhortation to act as if the contrary were true. But the combat soldier knows the truth. He thinks of his country and knows that he has left it. He knows when he left it. He had left it already when he was still in it. The train was carrying him across his own country but he was already out of it; when the troop train stopped in a station he would look out the window

at the train on the next track; there would be a girl and he would wave at her, and she would be an American girl, but already it was as if he were in a foreign land seeing an American girl on the cover of a magazine, so that he had already left America before his unit boarded the ship and the ship sailed for the Orient.

The combat soldier is bitter when he hears about strikes and hoarding at home, but that is because he is looking for an explanation of a bitterness he dares not completely explain. "If people behaved decently at home," he thinks, "the danger and the loneliness would be easier to bear."

It would not. The profound and lonely bitterness of the combat soldier cannot be cured. No speeches, no simple pomp in Arlington, no government controls, no private sacrifice, can annul that loneliness which is in the incontrovertible facts. The soldier has left his country, and he is alone.

We have seen him go and now there is the long Labor Day weekend, with the crowded roads, and then there will be Thanksgiving Day and Christmas, New Year's and Easter, but there won't be any real vacation until next year. The children soon will be going back to school. Soon there will be the World Series. And, of course, there is the job—or at least we hope there is the job. The soldiers have gone to the wars. The Roman legionaries have gone to the wars with Caesar. The British have gone to the wars at Agincourt. The Americans have gone to the wars with Lee, with Grant. In the country the wheat rises; the wheat is gathered in once more. In New York, at 42nd Street and Third Avenue, they are blasting deep into the Manhattan rock to set the foundations for a new skyscraper. The *Liberté* has sailed out through the Narrows to the open sea. But the soldiers have gone again to the wars, and the only thing one can say is that they are away from home, irremediably. —GOUVERNEUR PAULDING

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Street Scene: Puerto Rican Harlem